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ABSTRACT
(RE)INVENTING MATHEMATICAL LOGIC:
A CASE STUDY OF SET-BASED MEANINGS
FOR CONDITIONAL TRUTH
Alec Hub, M.S.
Department of Mathematical Sciences
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Paul Dawkins, Director

The way students interpret mathematical sentences involving logical connectives
sometimes differs from the way mathematicians interpret such sentences. This research study
identifies and analyzes some understandings that one student constructed while interpreting
conditional statements relating to numerical relationships and geometric shape categories.
Through a modified teaching experiment, a pair of students were guided to reinvent normative
understandings of truth-functional logic, namely that of material conditionals (conditional
statements) and their contrapositive’s equivalence. Through the case study of Hugo, the
researcher identifies shifts in his reasoning about conditional statements that gave rise to setbased meanings for conditional truth, as well as the challenges that he faced in systematizing
them. The researcher further proposes a framework to characterize mathematical logic learning
within mathematical content, and distinguishes three sequential levels of logic learning. These
three levels operationalize logic learning analytically and pedagogically by providing concise
criteria for collecting and measuring mathematical logic learning data. This study contributes to
the body of related research by providing elements of a Local Instructional Theory for the guided
reinvention of truth-functional logic.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics “Reasoning and Proof” process
standard (2000) puts forth, mathematics consists of much more than calculations and
computations. While proof-oriented mathematics has been traditionally confined to high school
geometry courses and advanced level college mathematics, attention has recently been refocused
on incorporating proof-oriented activity across the K-12 curriculum. To facilitate this curricular
and pedagogical refocusing, a better understanding of students’ proof-oriented activity is needed.
For example, how students interpret and use language in the mathematics classroom is a topic
that continues to require the attention of mathematics education researchers. This is the basis of
interest for this study.
Much mathematical activity, namely what is called proof-oriented, requires students to
attend to structure in mathematical situations and to investigate conjectures regarding structure.
While developing arguments about mathematical relationships students must interpret and reason
about mathematical language. When engaging in proof-oriented mathematics, students are
challenged to develop habits of language use that are reliable and unambiguous. The goal of
attending to language use in this way is to develop a precise and consistent system of
mathematical communication. To the mathematically initiated (i.e., those that have been trained
to participate in the mathematical community), a precise and consistent system of
communication is valued because it standardizes the mappings between language and meaning.
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From the perspective of the student who has not yet received such training, the norms of
communication within the mathematical community stand in contrast to what is found in
everyday discourse. Adopting the norms of the mathematical community is a nontrivial endeavor
and the existing body of literature has time and again revealed that students use mathematical
language very differently from mathematicians (e.g., Dawkins & Cook, 2016; Dubinsky &
Yiparaki, 2000; Epp, 2003; Stylianides, Stylianides, & Phillipou, 2004). However, the research
literature, as it concerns students’ reasoning processes relevant for apprenticeship into
mathematical language use, is in need of continued exploration by researchers.
The data presented in this study is drawn from a teaching experiment that was
orchestrated by Dawkins and Cook. I, acting as an observer to the teaching experiment sessions,
have analyzed said teaching experiment and present findings in this research study. Where
Dawkins and Cook (2016) is focused on students’ learning regarding disjunctions, this study is
focused on student learning relating to conditionals. Accordingly, this study addresses the need
to better understand, and model, students’ construction of key logical understandings that relate
specifically to conditional statements.
The Realistic Mathematics Education (RME) philosophy undergirds this research study.
Specifically, the RME notion of ‘experientially real,’ the principle of guided reinvention, and the
emergent model heuristic play central roles in the theoretical framework in which I embed this
research study. The notion of ‘experientially real’ refers to the capacity at which students can,
physically and/or mentally, interact with the proposed knowledge, and construct mathematical
meaning (Cobb, Yackel, & Wood, 1992; Gravemeijer & Terwel, 2000). Furthermore, in
experientially real settings, students can interact with the mathematics in a way such that they
progressively formalize their mathematical understandings (Gravemeijer & Stephan, 2002;
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Gravemeijer & Terwel, 2000). In this study of mathematical logic learning, the experientially
real quality is embedded in situations from which reflection on mathematical language use might
emerge. The RME curriculum design heuristic of guided reinvention was also central to the
teaching experiment design. Guided reinvention refers to processes in which students engage
with mathematics via through defining, organizing, algorithmatizing, and symbolizing, to
develop normative mathematical conceptions with the guidance of an instructor (Gravemeijer,
1999; Gravemeijer & Stephan, 2002). Specifically, during the experiment in this study, students
were guided to reinvent truth-functional definitions for conditional statements (“if...then…”).
Students were guided to an awareness of central relationships among such mathematical
statements (e.g., logical negation, logical equivalence). The emergent model heuristic
(accompanied by guided reinvention) facilitated the progressive formalization of students’
mathematical understandings. The aforementioned “emergent model” is a structure of
understanding which allows a student’s understanding of a mathematical concept to progress
from a model of a specific contextual problem, to the model itself becoming a reified
mathematical object. Such a progression, according to Gravemeijer (1999), entails four levels of
activity: situational, referential, general, and formal. As students act at these various levels, the
nature of their reliance on task-specific imagery shifts as their model of reifies into a model for
(Gravemeijer & Stephan, 2002). In this study, Gravemeijer’s four-tiered developmental
framework outlined the researcher-anticipation in this study, that Euler diagrams can serve as an
emergent model regarding student reasoning about conditional statements.
Closely documenting and analyzing students’ re-inventive activity in these teaching
experiment sessions served as the basis for the grounded theory of this study. Grounded in one
student’s (Hugo’s) reinvention of truth-functional definitions for mathematical conditionals, I
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present results and analysis that have informed the development of a descriptive framework of
mathematical logic learning. In this study, I present the case study of Hugo’s “reasoning about
mathematical logic,” from which I propose a framework for his construction of logical
understandings. The framework I present considers three operational definitions of mathematical
logic learning relating to logical form, logical structure, and logical meaning. This case study
also supplies elements to a Local Instructional Theory (LIT; Larsen, 2013) for the guided
reinvention of truth-functional logic. According to Larsen (2013), a LIT that is consistent with
the RME philosophy, describes how a specific topic could be taught so that students are given
the opportunity to reinvent mathematics. Most importantly, an LIT rationalizes a sequence of
instruction based on “a set of empirically and theoretically supported conjectures regarding how
the mathematics will emerge” (Larsen, 2013, p.713). The operational definitions of logic
learning that I will propose are grounded in student activity. As a case study, I contend that the
findings I present here are informative for practice and future research, but that they are not
universally sufficient in describing all students’ learning.
By using central principles of RME as a theoretic lens, this study seeks to address the
main questions:
•

How does Hugo interpret (mathematical) conditional statements?

•

What understandings does Hugo construct while interpreting such statements?

•

How can Hugo’s constructive activity inform a pedagogically and analytically
operational developmental framework?

In the following chapter I will review research literature that relates to these guiding
questions. The research and findings that follow will expand on three primary areas: the teaching
and learning of mathematical logic, Realistic Mathematics Education, and the guided reinvention
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of mathematical logic. By reviewing the existing related-research I will ground this research
study, and proffer its distinctive position within the growing body of related research.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE
This chapter presents some of the key, and particularly relevant, existing research
literature that provides the foundation from which my research has grown from. I present notable
works of research as they pertain to the learning of mathematical logic, Realistic Mathematics
Education, and the guided reinvention of mathematical logic. The review of research literature in
this chapter serves to lay the groundwork for addressing the following guiding questions:
•

How does Hugo interpret (mathematical) conditional statements?

•

What understandings does Hugo construct while interpreting such statements? And

•

How can Hugo’s constructive activity inform a pedagogically and analytically
operational developmental framework?

I discuss research findings that have bearing on these questions and point to areas in existing
research which I seek to extend with my findings.
Teaching and Learning Mathematical Logic
Historically, the term logic has been treated with a variety of meanings that, at times,
have conflicted (Toulmin, 1958). The evolving treatment of logic has resulted in a healthy debate
between experts, and the connection between formalized logic and student reasoning has been
widely researched (e.g., Inglis & Simpson, 2004; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Oaksford & Chater,
2002; Piaget, 1950; Rips, 1994; Schroyens, 2010; Stanovich, 1999; Stenning, 2002). While
historical investigations about students’ reasoning and logic are informative, this study is
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particularly concerned with mathematical logic. For the purpose of this study I broadly
characterize mathematical logic as that which entails matters of mathematical language use and
mathematical argumentation (Dawkins, in press). Students’ difficulties surrounding
mathematical logic are well-documented in previous research (e.g., Dawkins & Cook, 2016;
Dubinsky & Yiparaki, 2000; Durrand-Guerrier, 2008; Epp, 2003). In this study, I am primarily
concerned with mathematical logic learning that is rooted in students’ conscious reflection on
their activity. In this regard, I anticipate that the findings I present will extend the existing body
of research.
Inhelder and Piaget’s seminal work The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to
Adolescence (1958) provides a thorough discussion of the development of propositional logic
and the structure of formal thinking in children and adolescence while they solve problems in a
physical setting. This developmental theory occupies a middle ground somewhere between
psychology and logicism. Inhelder and Piaget’s research consisted of problem situations in
which participants interacted with a physical problem and, with experimenter involvement, were
guided to enact their thinking. With their extensive collection of experiments, Inhelder and
Piaget identified sixteen fundamental binary propositional operations closely organized by
conditional logical relations. For example, the disjunction operation refers to three potential
outcomes: p and q, p and –q, and q and –p. It is the integration of these operations that
supersedes an operation in isolation. Piaget’s (1958) logico-mathematical theory in this study is
complex and by and large exceeds the scope of the research I present here. Nonetheless, the work
of Inhelder and Piaget (1958) is foundational to my present study because of its early echoing of
constructivism. In the aforementioned study, the student’s understandings (propositional
operations) were neither innate nor learned through direct instruction. Rather, the propositional
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operations were constructed through gradual self-organization. An important feature of Piaget’s
model is that, although integrated system of sixteen relationships is integrated (once a certain
stage of development has been reached), the system itself is not generally accessible to the
thinker on a conscious level (1958).
As previously stated, students’ reasoning in relation to formalized logical has been
widely studied. In this study, I narrow my focus to students’ reasoning in relation to conditional
logic and the closely related inferencing behavior. This narrowed area of logic has also been
widely studied, from both psychological perspectives (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002;
Schroyens, 2010; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) and, perhaps more pertinent, mathematics
education perspectives (e.g., Adi, Karplus, & Lawson, 1980; Behr & Adi-Khoury, 1986;
Stylianides, Stylianides, & Philippou, 2002). Wason and Johnson-Laird’s (1972) four-card task
served as a basis for much initial research on conditional logic. For example, in the four-card
task, students were presented with four two-faced cards with letters one side and numbers on the
other, but only one side of each card was showing. The students were then asked to respond to a
statement to the effect of “Consider the claim: If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an
even number on the other side. What cards must you turn over in order to determine if the claim
is true?” This task was intended to probe students’ deductive reasoning regarding this conditional
claim. I point out that, although containing references to numbers and parity, this task is not
about logical reasoning about mathematical content. Adi, Karplus, and Lawson (1980) used a
modified written version of the four-card test (see Appendix A) and assessed the behavior and
reasoning of over 500 students ranging from elementary grades to university. Adi and her
colleagues modified this task prompting for explicit justification. After collecting responses, they
developed nine reasoning categories to sort student behavior and reasoning. Quantitative analysis
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of their results echoed Wason and Johnson-Laird’s (1972) observation by concluding that the
logical equivalence between a material conditional statement and its contrapositive does not
“seem to be psychologically equivalent” based on students’ behavior (Adi et al., 1980, p.493).
Adi et al. (1980) point out that with this type conditional logic task, familiarity with the content
and the modes of representation, seem to have different influences on student behavior and
reasoning performance. This observation has bearing on the findings I present because my results
draw upon students’ interaction with familiar mathematical content. Furthermore, the findings I
present come from a more clinical setting in which there was involvement by the experimenter.
Underlying the work of Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) and Adi et al. (1980) was
students’ inferencing behavior (Behr & Adi-Khoury, 1986). This inferencing behavior consists
of 1) discovering a (mathematical) rule, 2) testing the hypothesis, and 3) generalizing the
hypothesis to other instances. In Behr and Adi-Khoury (1986), the authors explored students’
behavior in a specifically mathematical context. Students were presented with a list of ordered
pairs of numbers and asked to discover a function rule relating the pairs. The students were then
tasked with testing their hypothesis and generalizing it to other instances. Unlike the four-card
task, Behr’s and Adi-Khoury’s task implored students to generate a claiming statement of their
own and then evaluate it. This notion of student discovery is echoed in the research methodology
of the findings I present. Among the findings that Behr & Adi-Khoury present, are a correlation
between students’ success in discovering, testing, and generalizing hypotheses, and an
observation that young students (3rd and 5th graders) are more willing than adults to relinquish
their hypotheses when faced with contradictory evidence (1986). As Behr and Adi-Khoury point
out, this is not to suggest that students are necessarily applying formal reasoning better than
adults, but rather that the way students perceive conjectured relations (i.e., hypotheses) may be

10
different (1986). A final result that I share from Behr and Adi-Khoury (1986) is that the mode of
representation of a particular task affected mathematical hypothesis discovery differentially. That
is to say that some tasks, when presented pictorially were “easier” than when presented
symbolically. Relating to this observation, the findings I present respond to Behr’s and AdiKhoury’s (1986) call to investigate further, the roles of written and spoken words, along with
pictorial and symbolic modes, of communicating mathematical ideas.
Like Stenning (2002), I take the stance that logic instruction must be aimed at helping
students discover logical form within semantic content. Logic instruction has primarily focused
on the using one of three statement contexts: everyday statements (e.g., Epp, 2003),
mathematical statements (e.g., Dubinsky & Yiparaki, 2000), or the formal syntax of logic
(Hawthorne & Rasmussen, 2015).
Consider the following list of conditional statements that reflect varied contexts:
1) If a person is drinking beer, then they must be over 21 years old.
2) If a blop is a guampo, then it has frinkles.
3) If p, then q.
4) If for xÎ S P(x), then Q(x).
5) If a quadrilateral is a square, then it is a rectangle.
Statement one uses truly common language with familiar semantic content. Statements
such as this were used in Müller, Overton, and Reene’s (2001) longitudinal study on students’
conditional reasoning. Statement one is something that would not be out of place in everyday
discourse. Furthermore, the idea of consuming alcohol (beer) and individuals’ ages is not far
removed from everyday experience. As a result, the truth of the statement would naturally be
understood in terms of a semantic relationship between drinking alcohol and age (the legal age
for consumption of alcohol in many U.S. states is 21 years of age).
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Statement two uses pseudo-language with nonsense subjects. Surely, “blop,” “guampo,”
and “frinkles” are not objects or ideas that would be encountered or experienced in everyday
circumstances. Although the sentence structure resembles that of statement one, nonsense objects
lack familiar semantic content. An assessment of this statements’ truth-value could be parallel to
that of statement one (guampo blops have frinkles), but the semantic content of this assertion is
void. As such, statements like number two may be used to bypass students’ semantic reasoning
processes. Using statements like one and two in logic instruction seems to frame logic learning
within the realm of common language use and may align with students’ existing linguistic
faculties.
Statement three, with its symbols p and q, presents logic learning as pertaining to a more
esoteric language with unique syntax. This is because there is no inherent understanding of what
it means to be p or what is means to be q. Similarly, statement four uses symbols to represent the
statements’ objects. However, in this case, the unspecified object, x, is considered within some
universe, S, and the truth the of the statement is reliant on a function that relates the truth-value
of P to the truth-value of Q. Furthermore, what it means to be P and Q is not inherently familiar.
Accordingly, statement four again conjures elements of an esoteric language and a syntax that is
wholly unique from everyday language use. The truth of the third statement is formally assigned
as a function of the truth-values of the components p and q, and the fourth statement requires
interpreting P and Q as functions from all members of S to truth-values. The fourth statement is
true whenever all members of S for which 𝑃 𝑥 = 𝑇 also have the property 𝑄 𝑥 = 𝑇, where T
denotes a “true” truth-value.
Lastly, statement five blends everyday language use with specifically mathematical
objects (in this case geometry). Using mathematical statements, such as five, in logic instruction
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places logic within the specialized context of mathematical language. I believe that statement
five invites semantic reasoning like statement one, but unlike statement two. Like statement one,
statement five would not be out of place in everyday discourse, and the objects in the statement
have meanings that are familiar. To interpret and assess statement five, students must have some
understanding of what it means to be a square and what it means to be a rectangle. Like
statement one, the assertion “squares are rectangles” is semantically viable. Furthermore,
statement five bears semblance to statement four in that assessing the truth of the statement, the
student must reflect on a relation between the two predicates regarding being a square and being
a rectangle.
While the contexts of these five statements are clearly varied, I propose that they
encourage subtle, yet important, differences in interpretive processes. For example, statement
one being true entails a semantic relationship between the consumption of alcohol and age,
whereas the truth of statement three is assigned based on a function relating the truth-values of
the components p and q, where p and q lack any inherent meaning.
In this study, I focus on mathematical statements, like example statement five above,
because they uniquely afford both semantic interpretations (like statement one) and formal
mathematical interpretations (like statement four). Dawkins and Cook (2016), making similar
observations regarding statement context, focused on students’ interpretations of specifically
mathematical disjunctions. Once again, from a semantic perspective, one can interpret statement
five’s truth as a statement of a relationship between squares and rectangles (all squares are
rectangles) or from a formal mathematical perspective as a relationship between two truth-values
that range over the set of squares and the set of rectangles. Only in mathematics are these two
interpretations fully compatible. This is because mathematical logic is situated at an intersection
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between linguistic systems (i.e., everyday discourse) and highly logical systems like that which
Gottlob Frege created and Bertrand Russell championed (Grattan-Guinness, 2000). In a sense,
Inhelder and Piaget (1958) also made use of this observation.
A primary intention of the mathematical logic construct is to establish norms and
conventions of mathematical communication. These norms and conventions are important
because they establish unambiguous links between language and meaning. As a result, the
interpretations of mathematical statements become unequivocal. The value of this result is
apparent in the mathematical setting, but such norms are not always apparent to students. For
example, when considering mathematical statements, mathematicians attend to the dependent
nature of meaning with the order of appearance of objects in sentences (Dubinsky & Yiparaki,
2000). In common language, order and associated meaning is less rigid. Epp (2003) discusses the
complications inherent in the use of well-constructed everyday statements whose meanings
violate this convention of order and associated meaning. For example:
A parent who wishes to communicate to a child, “You can go to the movie if, and
only if, you finish your homework” seldom, if ever, uses this sentence. Normally
such a parent either promises “If you finish your homework, then you can go to
the movie” or threatens “You can go to the movie only if you finish your
homework.” But the parent offering the reward in the first statement intends the
child to understand that if the homework is not finished the child will not be able
to go to the movie (even though this threat is not technically a part of the
statement), and the parent threatening the punishment in the second statement
would certainly not withhold the reward if the homework were completed (even
though the statement made does not actually promise it). (Epp, 2003, p.889)
I first note that in this excerpt, Epp is using “technically” to mean “the way the sentence is
interpreted by mathematicians.” This excerpt highlights the inconsistencies between
interpretations of everyday statements and interpretations that abide by the conventions of
mathematical language.
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The difference I see between mathematical language use and everyday language is the
question as to whether one can use reasonableness and speaker intention as tools for interpreting
and drawing inferences from a claim. Since mathematical language is assumed to be
unambiguous, speaker intention should be irrelevant. This is not the case for everyday language
use. Considering Epp’s example above, in an everyday circumstance the parent’s intended
meaning would be inferred by the child. Coming from a position of authority, a child would
typically interpret the statement “If you finish your homework, then you can go to the movie” as
a bi-conditional rule. Considering these observations regarding statement context, traditional
transition-to-proof approaches, which treat mathematical logic as a subject to be taught
independent of particular content, “appear unlikely to help students impose logical structure
within semantic reasoning” (Dawkins & Cook, 2016).
Realistic Mathematics Education
I adopt this characterization of mathematical logic in part because it aligns with the
instructional design principles of Realistic Mathematics Education (RME; Freudenthal, 1973;
Gravemeijer, 1994). The foremost tenet of the RME perspective on mathematical learning
purports that mathematics is a human activity, rather than a collection of timeless and objective
truths (Freudenthal, 1973). Furthermore, the RME philosophy emphasizes that students’
mathematical activities be rooted in experientially real settings (Cobb, Yackel, & Wood, 1992;
Gravemeijer & Terwel, 2000). In this context, ‘experientially real’ is taken to mean that students
can, physically and/or mentally, interact with the proposed knowledge, and construct
mathematical meaning. These two principles strongly influenced the overarching structure of this
study’s methodology. In experientially real settings, students interact with the mathematics in a
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way such that, through defining, organizing, algorithmatizing, and symbolizing, they
progressively formalize their mathematical understandings (Gravemeijer & Stephan, 2002;
Gravemeijer & Terwel, 2000). It is through these mathematical practices that students genuinely
engage in mathematics that is rooted in their activity, as opposed to obtaining esoteric knowledge
that is handed down from more knowledgeable others. Rather than students’ prior experiences
existing disjoint from what Freudenthal (1973) has called “ready-made mathematics,” the RME
perspective frames students’ development as “a process of gradual growth in which formal
mathematics comes to the fore as a natural extension of the student’s experiential reality”
(Gravemeijer, 1999, p.156). In this regard, the students’ mathematical activity is personally
meaningful and reflective of a progressive expansion of their mathematical reality, not a bridging
of a gap of two states of knowing. Through the RME perspective, the aforementioned
mathematical practices (defining, organizing, etc.), facilitate the construction of students’
mathematical understanding, and so, are central to the incorporation of formalized mathematical
ways of knowing into their “common-sense” (Gravemeijer & Terwel, 2000).
The curriculum design heuristic called guided reinvention is also central to RME. Guided
reinvention, as the term suggests, is the process in which students engage with mathematics via
the previously presented mathematical practices, and develop normative mathematical
conceptions with the guidance of an instructor (Gravemeijer, 1999). It is not the case that
students must independently create, and come to understand mathematics that has long been
understood by the mathematical community. Rather it is that through the careful construction of
learning situations and thoughtful teacher support, that students will more effectively follow a
pathway of learning that mimics historical impetus and arrives at normative mathematical
understandings. The instructor’s role in guided reinvention must not be overlooked. While
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student actions are central in the RME tradition, the instructor’s role may at first appear much
more “behind-the-scenes.” However, it is the instructor’s preparation of learning situations that
possess necessary mathematical perturbations, and appropriate didactic supports, that allow
normative conceptual progression. It is necessary to note here, that the driving force behind the
RME tradition is to redress what Freudenthal calls the antididactic inversion, which can be used
to describe traditional, deductive modes of instruction (Gravemeijer & Terwel, 2000). More
traditional modes of mathematics instruction, which follow deductive paths rather than cognitive
or historical ones are considered incongruous with the RME perspective of mathematical
learning because the practical perturbations of the mathematics are often inverted. Put slightly
differently, the launching point of the logical structure is often taken to be the end result of the
conceptual development itself. For instance, limits were developed centuries after the original
calculus to formalize the theory, but are usually taught as the preliminaries to calculus. Similarly,
mathematical logic was formalized quite late in the history of deductive proving (separated by
over 2000 years from Euclid’s Elements), and yet is taught as a preliminary to proof-oriented
mathematics. With this in mind it is easy to see that such a sequence of intended learning would
seem unnaturally motivated. In response to the antididactic inversion, the RME perspective
embraces an emergent model heuristic. The emergent model heuristic (accompanied by guided
reinvention) facilitates a progressive formalization of students’ mathematics.
Let us further unpack emergent model. An emergent model is a structure of
understanding that allows the progressive formalization of a mathematical concept to move from
modeling a particular contextual problem to a point at which the model becomes a reified
mathematical object itself. Let us consider, for example, Gravemeijer’s (1999) illustration of the
empty number line as an emergent model situated in the elementary years. Initially, the students
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were tasked with determining “How many pages still have to be read?” given that the book
contains 64 pages total, and that 37 pages have already been read. Certainly, this prompt is
placed in a context that is experientially real to students and affords clear goals and methods for
seeking a solution. In brief, the launching point for this emergent model is an informal solution
method designated the “string method” which added and subtracted in “steps” to arrive at a
solution. In considering an empty number, the student first establishes endpoints and then counts
up or down by “steps”. For example, 64 − 35 is depicted in Figure 1 as:

Figure 1: Subtraction by “steps” (from Gravemeijer, 1999).

The student determines the step size and in which direction to proceed. Over time with repeated
exposure to similar problems, the student’s use of the number line can come to describe more
sophisticated methods of solving. The number line initially serves as a way to demonstrate the
original context and serves as a form of explanation or justification. This ongoing use and
consideration of the number line facilitates shifts in students’ attention to number relations. In
summary, the empty number line initially serves as a model of an informal solution strategy that
is grounded in the particular context, and gradually shifts to become a model for general
mathematical relations between numbers (i.e., addition and subtraction). As a result, the number
line itself has become an object of mathematical study and not merely a means to an end
(Gravemeijer, 1999; Gravemeijer & Stephan, 2002). In review, an emergent model is an
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evolving conception of a mathematical idea that has the potential to progress to a more formal
understanding. It is a conception grounded in student solution methods that is conducive to
alignment with mathematically normative ways of knowing. I say ‘conducive’ as a teacher/
researcher judgment since the comparison between student models and normative mathematics is
only available to the mathematically initiated. A model with the potential to emerge into a
normative way of knowing is not guaranteed, and the role of guided reinvention must not be
neglected. It is imperative that the instructor guides students, through careful task preparation
and improvised supports, along what one considers to be a promising, natural progression to
formal mathematics.
Let us now turn our attention to the gradual shift from model of to model for. This
gradual shift occurs as the student uses their model in new ways and in new contexts. According
to Gravemeijer (1999), we can consider this gradual shift to occur across four levels of student
activity. The first level of activity occurs in the task setting (situational level) where students’
interpretations and solutions directly depend on understanding how to act in a particular,
experientially real problem setting. Activity at this most informal level does not use any
mathematical modeling as we know it, and often occurs in everyday-type situations. Progressing
to the referential level, activity begins to include models of the task setting. Students’
mathematical activity at this level generates ways to describe and give grounds for solution
methods in conjunction with a model that is used to make sense of the task. As Gravemeijer and
Stephan (2002) put it, “[students are able] to reason with a model while thinking about acting in
the modeled situation” (p.159). As students’ attention shifts from contextual meaning to
mathematical relations, they are entering a general level of activity. At this level, the role and
character of the model begins to change into that of a model for mathematical reasoning. At this
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point interpretations and solutions are increasingly less reliant on imagery that is specific to the
task setting. Fittingly, activity at this level is more general in nature, and is distancing the focus
from explicit tangible activity. This may be evidenced either by students using relations that are
incompatible with the original task setting or by employing the same model in a novel, dissimilar
setting. Finally, at the fourth level of formal activity, students no longer require a model to
support their mathematical reasoning. At this level, the model no longer simply represents a
mathematical process grounded in a particular task setting, rather the process has been reified
and has become the object of mathematical study. For example, in the empty number line task
alluded to earlier, the students’ initial focus is on counting as a process and progressively
develops to a conception of numbers as mathematical entities which possess particular
characteristics (Gravemeijer, 1999). This process of reification is occurring in tandem with
students’ symbolizing activities (Johnson, 2013). Initially, students’ symbolizations serve as a
record-of (Johnson, 2013) their mathematical activity; the symbols are a direct reference to their
mathematical actions. Through ongoing mathematical activity, and progression in Gravemeijer’s
four levels, the students’ symbolizations acquire a utilitarian character as they begin to serve as a
tool-for subsequent mathematical activity (Johnson, 2013). While Gravemeijer’s four-tiered
developmental framework of student activity is useful, it is important to observe that it is not a
strict hierarchy (Gravemeijer & Stephan, 2002). In actuality, students may exhibit activity
characterized by different levels with each re-visitation, or experience with similar tasks.
Guided Reinvention of Mathematical Logic
I concur with Dawkins (in press) that the creation of mathematical logic’s conventions
requires students to problematize and systematize their language use. Prescriptive tools of logic
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such as truth tables and Euler diagrams may provide generalizable ways of associating meaning
with mathematical language, but assumptions that these abstractions are intuitive to students
must be considered with caution. Prior research (e.g., Dawkins & Cook, 2016; Dubinsky &
Yiparaki, 2000) has shown that students’ interpretations of mathematical statements do not
follow important assumptions and norms by which mathematicians interpret mathematical
language. For example, Dawkins and Cook (2016) in their analysis of one pair of student
participants confirmed that students sometimes adopt inconsistent strategies when interpreting
mathematical disjunctions. One such “truth-functional strategy” entailed interpreting “or”
exclusively based on what “seemed more appropriate” to the student (Dawkins & Cook, 2016).
This interpretation runs counter to the inclusive “or” that mathematicians use. Dubinsky and
Yiparaki (2000) designed their study to compare students’ interpretations of logically similar
everyday and mathematical statements with multiple quantifiers (i.e., “for all…there exists…”
and “there exists…for all…”). Dubinsky and Yiparaki recruited 63 college students of varied
backgrounds. Most of the students were mathematics or mathematics education majors, and
attended either a large public university or a small liberal arts college. The student participants
were presented with a questionnaire in which they were tasked with determining whether each
declarative statement was true or false. The participants were told that there were no correct or
incorrect answers, and were encouraged to write a few sentences explaining their reasoning.
Some of the statements included on the questionnaire were: “There is a mother for all children.”
“There is a perfect gift for every child.” And “For every positive number a there exists a positive
number b such that 𝑏 < 𝑎.” Dubinsky and Yiparaki found that students’ interpretive tendencies
did not match mathematicians’ interpretations in which the order of appearance the statement is
critical to the meaning of the statement. As a result, Dubinsky and Yiparaki concluded that the
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everyday statements introduced too many linguistic complications not conducive to
mathematical logic. And so, they recommended against using such statements in future
instruction. Other studies have focused on logical formalisms rather than semantically
meaningful language. For example, Hawthorne and Rasmussen (2015) in their study, regarding
undergraduate students’ conceptions relating truth tables and conditional statements, showed that
not all students perceive the formalisms of logic to have any relevance to either mathematical or
everyday language. In short, they have found that students do not formalize their familiar
language use, but rather that what they develop as “mathematical logic” exists as an isolated,
esoteric form of knowledge.
Problematizing and systematizing serve as underlying principles of students’
mathematical logic learning. Problematizing refers to student’s attending to variations in the
ways they interpret similar statements. For example, a student who is problematizing reflects on
using an inclusive “or” interpretation of one statement and an exclusive “or” interpretation of
another or compares two possible readings of the same statement. This variation reveals a
problematic interpretative process because of the inconsistencies it may yield. Such
problematizing may prompt students to develop a more consistent set of conventions for
interpreting; which is called systematizing. For example, a student’s conscious decision to
regularly interpret “or” inclusively constitutes a systematizing act. By developing a systematic
method of interpretation, statements of similar form can be consistently interpreted regardless of
variations in statements’ content. I assert the importance of problematizing and systematizing
because students’ interpretive processes often take place subconsciously, and the discrepancies
that may arise from statement context must be explicitly addressed. This study aimed to foster
student systematization, and I anticipate that for many students this would require guidance to
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consciously problematize language use. This also distinguishes this study from most psychology
literature, which focuses on students’ automated language and logical reasoning processes.
The goal of the teaching experiment in this study was to guide students to an
understanding of truth-functional logic that “might be propitious for building more powerful
ways to deal mathematically with their environments,” (Thompson, 2008, p.1-43). Specifically, I
seek to thoroughly document and examine one student’s learning of mathematical logic. In this
study, I consider one student’s learning in one teaching experiment. Of particular relevance to
this study, Dawkins and Cook (2016) observed students’ propensity to interpret statements using
example-based, property-based, and set-based representation strategies. This research study uses,
and extends, these representation strategies. To illustrate the difference between these strategy
categories, consider the conditional statement, “If a triangle is obtuse, then it is not acute,” and
the following sample responses:
Example-based: A triangle with angle measures 100°, 50°, and 30° is obtuse and
that triangle is also not acute because 100° is not an acute angle.
Property-based: Obtuse triangles have one obtuse angle. Since obtuse angles
have measures greater than 90°, that is not an acute angle, and acute triangles
have all angle measures less than 90°. So obtuse triangles are not acute triangles.
Set-based: The set of not acute triangles consists of right triangles and obtuse
triangles. Since the set of all obtuse triangles is within the set of not acute
triangles, the statement is true.
In practice, students may draw on multiple representation strategies for the same task,
and mathematicians can simultaneously coordinate them, though this is not always the case. The
teaching experiment which this study draws upon promoted set-based representation strategies
because of its anticipated (by the researcher) usefulness in discovering what I refer to as the
subset relation meaning for conditional truth (or subset meaning for brevity). I place value on the
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subset meaning because it can be used to justify an important notion in mathematical logic:
contrapositive conditional statements share truth-values (are logically equivalent).
The contrapositive equivalence concept, in Simon’s (2017) sense, is the result of
reflective abstraction on the part of the learner. By reflecting on their own activity, rather than
observations, the learner constructs more complex ideas by reassembling existing ideas (Simon,
2017). In a sense, then, the contrapositive equivalence concept is a learned anticipation that is
based on the learner’s own activity (Simon, 2017). I will further unpack my intended
understanding of contrapositive equivalence by using Simon’s (2017) “explication of
mathematical concepts.” In Simon’s sense, “A mathematical concept is a researcher’s
articulation of intended or inferred student knowledge of the logical necessity involved in a
particular mathematical relationship” (p.7). As such, contrapositive equivalence, as I will
explicate, reflects my understanding of how a student may come to know its necessity. The
contrapositive equivalence concept includes the following four understandings: 1) A conditional
statement is true when the set of objects that satisfy the if part (the antecedent) is a subset of the
objects that satisfy the then part (the consequent). 2) These two sets can be represented spatially
with their relationship represented topologically. That is, they can be represented by regions in
space in which points represent individual mathematical objects. 3) The negation of a
mathematical property refers to the complement of the set of objects referred to by the original
property. 4) Therefore, whenever a conditional statement is true, its contrapositive is necessarily
true because the complement of the then set is contained in the complement of the if set. This is
illustrated with an explicit case in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Contrapositive equivalence via subset relation.

The contrapositive equivalence concept, as presented above, is a necessary consequence
of understandings 1-3. I am not claiming that the contrapositive equivalence concept must be
constructed via diagrams (i.e., Euler diagrams), but rather that the logical necessity of
contrapositive equivalence hinges on the first three understandings that I have listed.
Specifically, I anticipate that this collection of understandings is facilitated only by the learner
reasoning in similar ways about conditional truth regardless of the semantic content of each
mathematical statement. These understandings are by no means trivial, as previous research has
shown. The complement operation, which is central to justifying contrapositive equivalence with
the subset meaning, is not a trivial matter for students. Dawkins and Cook (2016) found that
students do not always associate negative properties with the complement of the set of objects
with the original property. Specifically, Dawkins and Cook (2016) found that some students’
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modes of activity do not seem to lend themselves to the development of a robust complement
operation. This is not to say that the students could not have formed such a useful understanding,
but rather that a number of students reasoned about negative properties in ways that were
inconsistent with the complement operation.
Dawkins and Cook’s (2016) reasoning strategy categories, in the context their teaching
experiment, often related to truth conditions which served as criteria for determining the truthvalue of statements. I shall refer to those truth conditions as meanings (Thompson, 2013).
Thompson (2013) characterizes meaning as the set of inferences available to one based on
understanding something in a certain way. For example, a student’s meaning of slope may entail
relationships between inclination, repeated ratio, rate of change, and “rise over run.” Each of
these meanings of slope would afford different conclusions or ways of acting in particular task
settings. I adopt Thompson’s sense of meaning because it is attributed to individuals rather than
to ideas themselves. It frames students’ knowledge acquisition in a position where educators can
influence the construction of mathematical meanings (Thompson, 2013). Furthermore, this sense
of meaning captures students’ learning as an expanding, evolving cognitive process; as opposed
to static attributes. Additionally, meaning in Thompson’s sense is tied more to what one does
with a concept or what one infers about it. In this regard, Thompson’s sense of meaning is highly
compatible with the spirit of RME. A student’s meaning for a conditional is entailed in the
process by which they affirm or deny statements. The students in the teaching experiment I will
present made a number of such judgments before they ever became able to articulate a particular
criterion they used to make such judgments. Tying meaning to inferences captures both students’
enacted ways of reasoning before they reflect on that activity and their conscious reflections once
they specify criterion for when conditionals are true or false.
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Each of the strategies Dawkins and Cook (2016) identified (example-based, propertybased, and set-based) afford different meanings for disjunctive truth. They also correspond to
meanings for conditional truth as demonstrated in the example above. A student may enact a
counterexample meaning by producing a quadrilateral that falsifies the statement: If a
quadrilateral is not a square, then it is not a rectangle. A student rejecting this statement by this
example may facilitate, but is not tantamount to, that student articulating a general criterion for
when a conditional is false. Only when the student articulates such a generalizable criterion can
their counterexample meaning be organized within a larger logical system. Both ways of
reasoning (enacted or articulated) can be mediated by the representation of the rectangle
counterexample. This representation, as well as the inferences it affords (e.g., the statement is
false), are constituents of an enacted meaning for counterexample. This collection of actions
would also be situated within Dawkins and Cook’s example-based reasoning strategy category.
Within this view of teaching logic, what do I mean by learning mathematical logic? In the
context of this study I propose that mathematical logic learning consists of three strands of
relationship building which pertain to logical form, logical structure, and logical meaning (i.e.,
meaning of conditional truth). This perspective on mathematical logic learning, in a general
sense, preceded the analysis of the data that follows in this study. How analysis of the data has
informed this perspective follows in chapter five. At the level of logical form, I contend that
students’ logic learning consists of identifying a sameness across tasks (as documented in
Dawkins & Cook, 2016). “Task” in this study usually refers to determining a statement’s truthvalue. One example of identifying sameness across tasks is that a disjunction is made up of two
parts separated by an “or.” Logic learning as it relates to logical structure is marked by student’s
using and relating representations (e.g., Euler diagrams), or by using the same representation to
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interpret multiple statements. The representations that I speak of may be mental, physical, or
some combination in between. Recognizing a sameness between representations, and further
connecting different representations may occur within or between tasks. For instance, I propose
that a student may connect their example-based and set-based representations for the same
statement or use the same set-based representation for different, related tasks (as in Figure 2).
However, I acknowledge that just because a student may use multiple representations on the
same task, this does not necessarily constitute evidence of the formation of logical structure. In
this study, I require that the student either compares or treats those representations as conveying
the same information. I shall refer to this as a coordination of representations. Subsequently, the
student’s meanings may in effect be amended. Lastly, I propose that logic learning entails a
consciousness of logical meanings. In other words, that students are reflectively aware of the
meanings they have constructed. The notion of sameness again enters the picture. Although,
sameness of meanings, in this case, constitutes logical equivalence. I contend that differing
representations have the potential to be related in the construction of new meanings. These
operational definitions of logic learning do not suggest that students’ use of example-, property-,
or set-based reasoning strategies indicate meanings that are inherently the same across tasks. For
instance, the nature of example-based representations surrounding integers may support
meanings that differ from those which arise surrounding examples of rectangles.
This chapter presented works from the existing body of research literature that have
particular bearing on mathematical logic, Realistic Mathematics Education, and the guided
reinvention of mathematical logic. The works which I have presented coalesce and underpin the
recent findings I present in this study. In the next chapter I will outline the methodology I used to
conduct, collect, and analyze data.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study seeks to address the following questions:
•

How does Hugo interpret (mathematical) conditional statements?

•

What understandings does Hugo construct while interpreting such statements?

•

How can Hugo’s constructive activity inform a pedagogically and analytically
operational developmental framework?
In this chapter I address the first two questions. I present the method by which students’

interpretations were documented and how student constructions were identified and analyzed.
This research methodology provides the grounding by which I will later address the third
question. Specifically, this chapter outlines the research design heuristic that was used (a
teaching experiment), the selection of participants, the method for tracking and analyzing student
activity, and discusses the instructional materials and protocol.
Teaching Experiment Design
The research findings I present in this study are drawn from a constructivist teaching
experiment (Steffe & Thompson, 2000) in which student participants were guided to conscious
understanding of their own mathematical logic. The instructional design was guided by the RME
heuristics of guided reinvention and emergent models. Consistent with teaching experiment
methodology, students’ observable actions were used to help them construct and continually
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revise second-order models of the students’ meanings for their own activity. The instruction
engaged students in the experientially real activity of logic in the form of thinking about
language use. Through the RME lens then, this study places students in situations from which
reflection on language might emerge. In other words, the emphasis in the guided reinvention is
not directly on the development of mathematical formalisms, but rather on the development of
mathematical thinking about language use. With a focus on mathematical language use, the
mathematical contexts of each task served as a familiar back drop in which students would act.
Furthermore, the use of long-familiar mathematics contexts (such as parity, divisibility, and
geometric classifications) in this study, facilitated an experientially real setting for the students.
The results which this study analyzes in chapter 4, are drawn from three, one-hour
sessions of a larger, seven session teaching experiment. The larger teaching experiment guided
students to reinvent truth-functional definitions of quantified disjunctions, conditionals, and
quantified statements (in this order) over the course of seven sessions. The mathematical content
of the statements (as can be seen in Appendix B) should have been familiar to the Calculus III
students who were recruited to participate in the study. The sequence of statement types was
intentional because the simpler disjunctions were intended to encourage students to develop tools
of interpretation that could then be adapted to conditionals (Dawkins, in press) and also multiplyquantified statements. Students’ difficulty with interpreting these types of statements in
mathematically normative ways have been well-documented, and investigated in previous
research (Dawkins, in press; Dubinsky & Yiparaki, 2000; Durrand-Guerrier, Boero, Douek, Epp,
& Tanguay, 2012; Epp, 2003; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Weber & Alcock, 2005). The
particular findings presented, and discussed in this study, focus on the learning of one target
student (Hugo), and his co-participant, in relation to conditional mathematical statements over
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the course of three sessions. These three sessions took place on days three, four, and five, of the
seven session experiment.
Participant Selection, Data Collection, and Analysis Procedure
The study participants were recruited from third-semester undergraduate calculus courses
at a Midwestern university in the United States. This demographic of students was targeted due
to three anticipations: 1) that they be proficient with the mathematical content of the statements
to be presented, 2) that they had not taken courses in proof-oriented mathematics, and 3) that
they have potential benefit in future course-work by attending to mathematical logic. Participants
in the study were required to complete a questionnaire prior to the teaching experiment in order
to assess experience with formal logic and normative logical interpretations. Participants were
chosen who did not answer the questionnaire in a manner consistent with formal logic, to ensure
they still needed to learn the target understandings. The teaching experiment sessions were
conducted weekly in a university classroom, but independent of their regularly scheduled
Calculus class meetings.
The data presented in this study reports results from working with the pair Hugo and Elya
(pseudonyms) with emphasis on the former. This pair of students was targeted because they
produced largely normative conclusions while completing tasks; could articulate their thinking;
and, after closer researcher inspection, demonstrated qualitative shifts in their ability to justify
and explain. The lead investigator of the seven-session teaching experiment was associate
professor, Dr. Paul C. Dawkins. Dawkins served as the teacher-researcher for the seven-session
teaching experiment. Dawkins also video recorded the proceedings of each session and made
initial field notes. Dawkins and Cook (2016) reported on findings that relate to the first two
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sessions about conditional statements. This study is concerned with learning that took place
during sessions three, four, and five regarding conditional statements. I did not attend
proceedings, but after each session I debriefed with the teacher-researcher to discuss student
development, propose effects of guiding actions by the teacher-researcher, and hypothesize
students’ learning trajectories in subsequent sessions. The ongoing analysis that took place
during debriefing meetings primarily related to: students’ heuristics and strategies for
determining truth-values, patterns of students’ linguistic interpretations of statements, and
moments in which students reasoned about logic (i.e., problematized and systematized
interpretations; Dawkins & Cook, 2016). After the seven teaching experiment sessions had
concluded I reviewed video recordings and field notes for each session. At this point, I began
retrospective analysis consisting of codes marked by timestamp and utterances, as well as the
production of narratives. These narratives chronicled the progressions of student reasoning via
conjecturing and explaining relations between tasks and interpretations, along with noted
patterns of interpretive behavior and reflection. The purpose of this analysis was to identify if,
when, and to what extent students developed durable interpretations of the various conditionals
and could reflectively control and discuss their interpretive behaviors.
In addition to daily debriefing and reviewing field notes, initial data analysis consisted of
watching video recordings while noting general student developments or moments of reflection.
Upon re-watching the video recordings, the character of students’ determinations was more
closely considered across all seven teaching experiment sessions. In addition to coding for
students’ reasoning strategies (E for example-based, P for property-based, and S for set-based),
timestamps were recorded along with seemingly notable moments of clearly articulated
reflection. I developed a coding scheme that accounted for the two students’ various strategies
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for determining the truth-values of the statements as well as whether their determinations were
normative (matched mathematicians’ shared truth-value). This coding scheme will be elaborated
on in Chapter 5. Within the three sessions that comprised the students’ conditional work Hugo
and Elya used example-based, property-based, and set-based strategies, but the third only with
prompting from the teacher-researcher. This case study focuses on Hugo because of the complex
ways in which he constructed set-based representation strategies over the three sessions.
Instructional Materials and Protocol
In one-on-two interactive settings, the procedure for guiding reinvention consisted of
presenting student pairs with lists of mathematical statements to be considered for that session.
The lists reflected a single type of mathematical statement (disjunctions, conditionals,
quantifieds) based on student progression through the teaching experiment. The teaching
experiment in its entirety consisted of seven one-hour long sessions. The duration of time spent
on each list of statements was not the same. The student work relating to conditional statements
in this study took place over three sessions, corresponding to days three, four, and five, of the
entire experiment sequence. The list of statements that students considered during these sessions
are found in Appendix B. With the introduction of new lists of statements, students were
prompted to determine whether each statement was true or false and to explain their reasoning.
The presence of partners acted as a natural impetus for discussion and explanation. After
considering the truth-value of each statement, the students were encouraged to observe and
identify any patterns related to the statements or their strategies on the tasks. Following that
prompt, students were then invited to develop a “How-to Guide” for determining the truth-values
of such statements. These teacher-researcher prompts did not occur at fixed intervals but rather
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occurred in response to the pace at which students’ progressed through each type of
mathematical statements. Unlike the disjunctions provided, all of the conditional statements were
quantified to encourage set-based reasoning (based on prior findings, Dawkins & Cook, 2016).
Because this study attempted to prioritize set-based meanings, perhaps the most important
prompt was that which invited the students to describe “the set of objects satisfying the first part
of each statement and the set of objects satisfying the second part” and examine relationships
between them.
This chapter outlined the research design heuristic (a teaching experiment), the thoughtful
selection of study participants, the method for tracking and analyzing student activity, and
discussed the instructional protocol of each session. I presented the method by which students’
interpretations were documented, and how student understandings were identified and analyzed.
With the research design outlined in detail, it is now appropriate to direct attention to specific
student activity as presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This chapter presents results that assist in answering the questions: 1) How does Hugo
interpret (mathematical) conditional statements? And 2) What understandings does Hugo
construct while interpreting such statements? After analyzing the interactions and results in this
section, I will turn my attention to addressing the final research question: How can Hugo’s
constructive activity inform a pedagogically and analytically operational developmental
framework?
This chapter presents analyses and findings regarding Hugo’s reinvention of truthfunctional interpretations of mathematical conditional statements. I present the results as eight
exchanges of dialogue and correspondingly analyze the student activity. I have categorized these
exchanges as they relate to activity which precedes set-based meaning formation and which
illustrates set-based meaning formation. In the latter, I further distinguish activity which relates
to what I call “if-then” coordination and the contrapositive equivalence inference.
The choice of following Hugo’s development was strategic. Compared to other students’
participation in similar teaching experiments (as reported by Dawkins and Cook (2016)), I see
Hugo’s learning about conditionals as an instructive middle ground. Some study participants
abstracted logical structure nearly immediately while other students completed the experiment
demonstrating little to no evidence of set-based reasoning or generalizable strategies for
conditionals. I investigated Hugo’s case because he made measured progress that allowed me to
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observe several intermediate stages in his construction of logical structure. In turn, this suggests
elements for a Local Instructional Theory (LIT), and hence addresses the third research question
to this study. Contributing to the formation of a LIT, the exchanges that follow are believed to
capture notable shifts in the nature of Hugo’s mathematical activity. As such, I present these
shifts as indicative of Hugo’s varied and evolving meanings for conditional truth.
Preceding Hugo’s Set-based Meaning Formation
During the first 45 minutes of the first session Hugo and his co-participant, Elya,
determined normative truth-values (I will refer to these hereafter as their determinations.) for
every statement on the list sees in Appendix B. During this initial run through the seventeen
presented statements, neither Hugo nor his partner used any set-like language (e.g., set, group,
collection) to refer to the relevant mathematical objects. Even though there was no demonstrable
use of sets in a mathematical sense, we cannot know whether they mentally imagined sets or
whether they could have with prompting. Nonetheless, their verbalizations or inscriptions
suggested only example- and property-based reasoning.
As stated above, Hugo and Elya made normative determinations about all of the
conditionals during their first pass through the tasks. Within two minutes of considering the first
task (If a number is a multiple of 3, then it is a multiple of 4.), Hugo chose the example integer 6
and recognized that it satisfied the antecedent but failed to satisfy the consequent. Hugo declared,
“So we came up with one case where it’s false, so it is false.” This general articulation about the
sufficiency of a single counterexample reflected Hugo and Elya’s previous work with
disjunctions. Hugo and Elya thus agreed on the counterexample meaning, by which, one
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counterexample is sufficient to declare a (quantified) conditional statement false. Hugo’s specific
example is a clear indicator that he used example-based reasoning on this task.
In general, Hugo’s activity in this first session seemed to display a preference for
reasoning with examples. Hugo used examples to determine truth-values for statements 1, 2, 4-6,
9, 11, and 13-16. In contrast, he affirmed statements 8, 10, and 17 by reasoning with properties.
For the remaining statements (3, 7, and 12) Hugo concurred with Elya’s determinations such that
I do not know how Hugo reasoned. For every false statement on the list (1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, and
14), Hugo used the counterexample meaning for conditional falsehood. Hugo’s strategy only
varied regarding true statements (3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, and 17). As noted before, statements
8, 10, and 17 indicated property-based reasoning. For example, regarding statement 8 (If a
triangle is not acute, then it is not equilateral.) he said, “not acute would mean either a right
triangle or an obtuse triangle. Neither of those can be equilateral, so that would be true.” In this
utterance, Hugo unpacked ‘not acute’ in terms of two other properties, and compared that to the
consequent property. Hugo declared the conditional true because the consequent property could
be inferred from the properties of the antecedent, which is a property-based meaning for
conditional truth (similar to Weber & Alcock’s, 2005, “warranted conditional”).
In other cases, Hugo seemed to affirm statements using particular examples. Regarding
statement number 15, “If the sum of two integers 𝑥 + 𝑦 is not even, then at least one of the
numbers 𝑥 and 𝑦 is not odd,” Hugo and Elya said:

37
Exchange 1
(Session 3, 35:0.1-35:28.4)
E (1):
H (2):
E (3):
H (4):
E (5):
H (6):
E (7):
H (8):

I think that’s true.
So if we came up with the sum is not even. So like 5 is not even.
Right. Then the two numbers that would add together to make that
one, one of them would have to be odd.
It’d be 4 and 1 or—
3 and 2.
Right.
But they would have to be—one would have to be odd.
Right. I agree.

In this exchange, Hugo displayed a preference for examples in the face of his partner’s propertybased explanation. It seems that Elya produced an example in deference to Hugo, but was
comfortable in her determination by using only a property-based inference. Elya considered the
warrant that only the sum of an even and an odd can be odd, whereas, Hugo seemed to produce
an example to legitimize his partner’s explanation. Thus, Hugo consistently reasoned with false
statements by using examples, but varied between using properties and examples with true
statements. Hugo never made an articulation of a general truth condition (meaning an abstraction
of his criterion for conditional truth). Despite arriving at normative determinations, the
variability in the nature of Hugo’s determinations suggests that he had not yet constructed a
consistent or conscious meaning for conditional truth.
During the last 15 minutes of the first session when the teacher-researcher prompted the
pair to think about sets, Hugo’s articulations and inscriptions suggested an evolving
understanding of conditional truth. Consider statements two through five:
1.
2.
3.
4.

If a number is a multiple of 3, then it is a multiple of 4.
If a number is a multiple of 3, then it is a multiple of 6.
If a number is a multiple of 6, then it is a multiple of 3.
If a number is a not multiple of 6, then it is not a multiple of 3.
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Regarding these statements, the participants and the teacher-researcher (denoted I) said:
Exchange 2
(Session 3, 45:33.8-49:29.9)
I (1):
H (2):
I (3):
H (4):
I (5):
H (6):
I (7):
E (8):

I (9):
H (10):
I (11):
H (12):
I (13):
H (14):

Think about the set of all things that satisfy the if part and the set of all
things that satisfy the then part. And tell me about the relationship
between those two […]
I’d say, if the statement is true then the set for the first part—I’m sorry
the set of the second part will be included in the set of the first part.
Okay. Why do you say that?
Um, because if we said that it’s true then when we pick—something
that’s true for the first part, then it has to be included in the second part
for the whole statement to be true.
[…] So you’re saying, if the statement is true then what was the
relationship here?
Then the—then will be inside if.
Okay. What do you think Elya?
I think the if has to be in the then but then doesn’t have to be in the if.
‘Cause there—when we looked at 3 there’s all the multiples of 6 are
contained in multiples of 3 but all multiples of 3 are not contained in
multiples of 6.
Do you agree with that, Hugo?
Yeah I think I’m good with that.
‘Cause I’m interested in why you—there is a relationship between the
two, so I’m kind of interested to know why you thought the then in the
if.
Um, I think my thought process was—
What are thinking about in a particular example?
Uh, you wanna talk about number 3. Um in like a circle, and multiples
of 3—3,6,9,12. [draws a circle and inside of it writes the numbers he
says aloud] Um, multiples of 6 will be included in that circle [draws
smaller circle around 6 and 12]. Like 6 and 12 are multiples of 6. So
there’s an additional circle inside that includes some numbers but does
not include others [completes diagram as seen in Figure 3].
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Figure 3: Hugo’s first set diagram on left; researcher-reproduction on right.

I (15):
H (16):

Okay—But sort of which are you calling the if part and which circle
are you calling the then?
The then part would be the bigger one [writes ‘then’ next to larger
circle]. The inside would be then—sorry other way around. Then is on
the outside. If is in [writes ‘if’ in small circle].

Even though Hugo did not display a propensity to reason with sets previously, he easily
considered sets when prompted to do so. Reasoning about sets in this way seemed novel for
Hugo, as evidenced by his answer being non-normative. Beginning in turn 14, Hugo considered
several examples together that shared the relevant properties. This populating action is further
evidence that his understanding was primarily example-based. The interviewer’s prompt led
Hugo to choose multiple exemplars that together represented an entire class of objects rather than
single objects serving as proxies for categories.
During this exchange, and throughout the rest of the first session, Hugo consistently
displayed this populating action (as in turn 14) in constructing sets. After doing so, he noted both
the resultant set relations and the statements’ truth-value. He also conjectured general set
relationships for conditional truth. His generalized conjectures were not self-consistent (consider
turns 2 and 6 versus turn 4). Depending on what Hugo meant by “included,” his conjectures in
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turns 2 and 6 seem inconsistent with the set relation between multiples of 6 and multiples of 3.
Thus, his initial attempts at forming a general set-based truth condition conflicted with his own
reasoning about the particular numbers. Once the interviewer prompted him to do so, Hugo
focused on a particular statement. Hugo chose statement 3 and populated the sets with particular
examples. This led Hugo to recognize the normative relation between the sets. However, his
reasoning after this episode showed that he did not generalize this relation (the subset meaning).
Consider the dialogue below, which took place moments after exchange 2:
Exchange 3
(Session 3, 51:55.5-53:12.7)
H(1):
I(2):
H(3):

[…] I think we would only be talking about true statements then—in
that situation. If the entire set of then is inside the entire set of the if—
but not necessarily containing all of them.
Can you tell—are you in a particular example, Hugo?
I was thinking of [statement] three. So the if—the if circle that contains
all multiples of 6—all of those numbers will be multiples of 3. So like
if—I guess the circle would be. The circle that contain multiples of 3
would include everything inside of the if. And, or—so that would
mean then would be—I’m sorry—the if would be inside then.

Similar to his hazy articulation in turn 16, Hugo’s articulations in this short exchange again
illustrate a lack of self-consistency in his reporting and reasoning. This inconsistency further
suggests that he, despite implying set relations, was unable to abstract a set-based meaning for
conditional truth. One explanation for why Hugo had not constructed a clear set-based meaning
for conditional truth was that his earlier activity in determining truth-values was not set based.
The interviewer invited Hugo to make general conjectures about sets and conditional truth,
though his did not constitute a generalization of his prior work. This is because his prior work
was example and property-based.
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Claims about Hugo’s reasoning at the end of the first session on conditionals:
• Hugo’s primary meanings for conditional truth were example- and property-based.
• Hugo enacted these meanings to assign normative truth-values to all of the given
conditionals.
• Hugo had a clear counterexample condition for falsehood, namely that the existence of
one example that satisfied the if and not the then, was sufficient for falsehood.
• He did not articulate a generalizable example-, or property-based truth-condition.
• At the interviewer’s prompting, Hugo formed sets by populating them with examples.
• Hugo’s conjectured set-based truth-conditions were inconsistent both with each other and
with his reasoning about particular task statements.
• When Hugo populated sets relating to a particular statement, he observed the normative
subset meaning. He did not seem to maintain this relation in later reasoning (even about
the same statement).
The Beginning of Hugo’s Set-based Meaning Formation
On the second day of working with conditional statements, Hugo’s partner was not
present. In the absence of his partner, I was better able to observe Hugo’s reasoning. After
recapitulating conditions for falsehood (recalling his counterexample meaning), Hugo began to
reanalyze statements 6 and 7:
6. If a triangle is not acute, then it is obtuse.
7. If a triangle is obtuse, then it is not acute.
Regarding these two statements, Hugo and the teacher-researcher said:
Exchange 4
(Session 4, 3:7.1-16:59.5)
H(1):

I(2):
H(3):

We said it [statement 6] was false ‘cause our first set included right
angles—or I’m sorry, right triangles so then—it was only asking if it
was only obtuse. So it could have been a right triangle or obtuse. Not
just obtuse. So it limited us. Which is why we said it was false.
Okay. So in terms of the two sets, what’s then the relationship between
the two sets?
I think the first set was—in order for it to be true the first set needed to
be entirely—encased by the second set.
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I(4):
H(5):

Okay. And in this case what in fact is the relationship?
Um. Kinda like the diagram they have— [creates diagram in Figure 4,
drawing the circles first and then writing “90º” and “O”] —they’re
circles and then they have the little—

Figure 4: Hugo’s diagram for statement 6 on left; researcher-reproduction on right.

I(6):
H(7):

Why don’t you just draw it? Whatever you’re thinking?
[creates diagram in Figure 5] So they have the similarity of an obtuse.
So this is 90 degrees. There are 90 degree triangles.

Figure 5: Hugo’s revised diagram for statement 6 on left; researcher-reproduction on right.
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I(8):
H(9):
I(10):
H(11):

So label for me what do those different circles represent? How are
you—
This is the if, not acute we said that could be a 90 triangle or obtuse.
And then the then was, it is obtuse so I guess that would be —this. So
it’s a little different than what I originally drew.
Okay. Why is it different?
Umm. Well originally I did this [diagram in Figure 4] but the only
thing encased in the then is obtuse and I said if this is obtuse—then
there’s not really anything over here.

Hugo invoked sets from the beginning of this exchange. In his initial remarks, Hugo
promptly referred to the set of “not acute” triangles and unpacked its properties. Hugo
semantically substituted (Dawkins & Cook, 2016) “right triangle or obtuse” for “not acute.”
Hugo did not draw any triangles in the course of this unpacking. In turn 3, Hugo articulated a
general truth condition based on set containment. Hugo attended to the properties of
mathematical objects throughout this exchange. Hugo implicitly relied on the theorem that
triangles have exactly one of three classifications: acute, right, or obtuse. Thus, triangles that are
not acute are one of the other two. Hugo mirrored his utterance in turn 1 with his construction of
the diagram in Figure 5, during turn 7. I cannot discern from the way Hugo labeled his diagram
(“If not acute” and “then obtuse”) whether he associated the circles with the position in the
sentence (antecedent versus consequent) or the mathematical properties (“not acute”, “obtuse”)
or both.
I see a distinction between Hugo’s production of Figures 4 and 5. He seemed to populate
Figure 4 without anticipating where all the relevant triangles would be situated. Turn 11 gives
evidence of this when Hugo later realized that one of the four sections of the Venn diagram
would be empty. In contrast, Hugo drew Figure 5 to express a subset relation that he recognized
between obtuse and non-acute triangles. The key distinction between Venn diagrams and Euler
diagrams is whether one uses the topology of the two curves to represent the relationship
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between the sets (Stenning, 2002). Hugo enacted this distinction by producing a Venn diagram in
Figure 4 which he subsequently populated, and by later producing an Euler diagram in Figure 5
to represent a subset relation he already acknowledged. Figure 4 was exploratory while Figure 5
was constructed to represent a known relationship.
I cannot easily categorize Hugo’s meanings in this episode as example-, property-, or setbased. The labels in his diagrams were somewhat ambiguous. He appeared to appropriately
coordinate between properties, exemplars, and sets. In turn 1 he clearly associated the first part
of the sentence with a set. In turns 1, 7, and 9, he quickly switched between singular and plural in
referring to obtuse and right triangles, suggesting any reference to examples being understood as
representatives of a class. While reading the statement in turns 7 and 9, Hugo simultaneously
unpacked the mathematical properties, which he used to populate the regions of his set diagram.
Hugo’s coordination, and the fluidity with which he was able to speak, may have been supported
by the semantic details of the statement (that each triangle is in exactly one of three groups). It is
unclear from this episode to what extent his coordination of sets, properties, and examples relied
particularly on his understanding of triangles. Would this type of coordination have surfaced in a
different semantic context (e.g., quadrilaterals, integers)? I shall rely on later exchanges to
address this question. Exchange 4 continued:
I(12):
H(13):
I(14):
H(15):
I(16):
H(17):
I(18):

Okay. Okay. So because of that then—so you said the statement—so
what part of the picture tells me that the statement is false?
That the then does not encase the if. The if encases the then.
Okay. And so why then? What’s my counterexample? What kind of
triangle makes this false?
What triangle would make it true?
No, which triangles make it false?
Oh, the 90 degree triangle because if it’s not acute it could still be a 90
degree but then—and that’s still not obtuse.
Okay so it would be not acute—not acute and at the same time not
obtuse.
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H(19):
I(20):
H(21):

Right.
Okay. Good, good. So then, look at number 7 and see what 7 says.
If it is obtuse then it is not acute. So that would be a circle that encases
all obtuse. [draws diagram in Figure 6]. All obtuse triangles. Then not
acute. Not acute could be 90 or obtuse. So that would be—. So in this
case, the then—encases the if. It was the opposite of that one. So it’s—
I think we decided that if we are talking about if-then statements we
only have to worry about what’s inside the if circle. So where they
have to worry then, the 90 is outside the if ‘cause we’re not talking
about 90 we’re only talking about obtuse. And then encases the if, so
all the possibilities of if are inside of then. So that was why that was a
true statement.

Figure 6: Hugo’s diagram for statement 7 on left; researcher-reproduction on right.

I(22):
H(23):

Okay. Now what’s different between your two pictures [Figures 5 and
6]?
Basically they just switched what I classified as if and what was then.

In turn 21 Hugo constructed an entirely new representation for statement seven. Since
statement seven pertains to the same mathematical properties as statement six, the teacherresearcher expected Hugo to use his previous diagram to interpret and represent the new task
statement. Hugo did not anticipate how to use the invariant relationship between the two
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predicates “not acute” and “obtuse.” Rather he repeated his previous mathematical activity of
creating an Euler diagram in full. Once again, Hugo labeled his circles with entire phrases from
the statement (“If obtuse”, “then not acute”), representing both the mathematical property and its
position in the statement. Either Hugo did not attend to the “switch” relationship between the two
statements that Elya had noted in their previous session or, at very least, it did not influence his
production of the Euler diagram for the converse statement. After eventually realizing that the
relationship between the properties remained the same between Figures 5 and 6, Hugo and the
teacher-researcher continued to discuss the inverse statements of 6 and 7, which Hugo created
(seen in Figure 7):

Figure 7: Hugo’s statements 6, 7, and their inverses on top; researcher-reproduction on bottom.
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H(24):

I(25):
H(26):
I(27):

H(28):

I(29):
H(30):
I(31):
H(32):
I(33):
H(34):
I(35):
H(36):
I(37):
H(38):

I(39):
H(40):
I(41):

[referring to the inverse of statement 6] So if acute then we’d be
talking about anything outside of the if circle [referring to figure 5], so
everything outside of here, then it is not obtuse—right. ‘Cause you’re
not—we’re talking about everything except inside this circle. And
obtuse is inside the circle. So that’d be true. We said this was false. So
it was the opposite, or the negation.
You don’t wanna say negation, we said negative. If—the term that’s
commonly used is actually what we call the inverse.
Okay.
Who knows why. But when you add a not to both—the top— called
the inverse. So in this case they have opposite truth-values. And then
the second blue one, if obtuse then acute. Or the not acute—we said
that is a true statement. So this next blue one is true and that will
determine the next one, why?
My guess is that it would be false ‘cause it’s—it’d be the opposite, but
if not obtuse, so anything that’s outside of this little circle [referring to
figure 6]—then it is acute. That’s not necessarily true because—that
would—we still have 90 degree—triangles that are not obtuse but are
still not acute. So that would still be false. Or that would be false.
Okay, now you anticipated it would be false. What was your basis for
anticipating that it would be false?
That one. We took the inverse of this one, we got the opposite—the
opposite truth-value.
And you were just thinking probably the same thing might happen?
Right
Okay. […] What about the picture tells me which two are true?
What about the picture tells that it’s true?
For instance, you’d already told me what made this one [statement 7]
true, actually.
That if we limited it to this inner circle—the obtuse triangles. Then,
obviously, we would not be talking about if it was outside of the circle.
We’re only talking about the inside.
Okay. Okay. What about then this one [inverse of statement 6]? How
can I see it in the picture, this one?
That if we’re talking about anything outside of this circle, the bigger
circle here, which would be all the acute. Then that would exclude
anything inside the circle—obtuse triangles are only inside the circle.
So then we would only be talking about the area out here.
Okay so tell me what you’re saying. You’re saying that all the acute
triangles are what? What are you saying when you say like all the stuff
out here is not in this, in here?
I’m talking about—I’m taking the infinite set of acute angles, however
many there are.
Right. So the acute triangles.
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H(42):

And then, if I only talk about those—then is it not obtuse? Well yeah,
I’m only talking about acute. So—if my—if I say if acute and I decide
what triangles I’m talking about, and I’m not worrying about what’s—
not in my set which is this circle.

I first note that during turns 24-42, Hugo reasoned normatively about multiple statements
(four to be exact) with the same diagram. Additionally, while reasoning about these statements,
he proposed an inductive anticipation (turn 28) that inverse statements would have opposite
truth-values. While this suggests that Hugo was now considering relationships between multiple
statements, we have no evidence that he made this conjecture based on relationships within this
mathematical context or based on meanings of conditional truth. Nonetheless, while reasoning
with this lone diagram, Hugo’s language use had changed in character. In particular, Hugo’s
word choice seemed to reflect a reliance on spatial language when talking about relations
between sets of objects. For example, he said; “anything that’s outside this little circle,” “outside
the circle,” and “the area out here.” Hugo’s use of this spatial language suggests that he was
using locations to represent the sets (all triangles that satisfy a given property). His language use
also reflected a semantically vague quality. This is reflected by his use of “90” and “right
triangle” when speaking about entire sets of objects. In this regard, Hugo was not relying directly
on the semantic content (property relations), but rather that he was using the diagram to reason.
Hugo rejected the inverse of statement 7 in turn 28 by the failure to uphold a subset
relation. He considered the set of non-obtuse triangles as represented by the complement of the
smaller circle and noted that not all of those triangles were in the acute region. This marked a
shift from his complete reliance on counterexamples to falsify claims during the previous
session. The complement set of obtuse triangles, which Hugo is referring to in this turn, was
constructed in turn 24 for the inverse of statement 6. Hugo said, “…but if not obtuse, so anything
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that’s outside of this little circle.” By observing that some non-obtuse triangles were not-acute, it
is unclear whether Hugo was simultaneously attending to both complement relations at once or
simply identifying the falsifying category of non-obtuse, non-acute triangles (the middle region).
By shifting his focus to regions of the diagram, Hugo generalized his counterexample meaning to
identify the entire set of triangles that falsified the claim.
The subset relation meaning for conditional truth, as Hugo exhibited in turn 21, was an
anticipated result of this teaching experiment. However, Hugo’s activity surrounding the inverse
of statement 6, and again for statement 7, indicated the emergence of an alternative, unexpected
meaning for conditional truth. In turns 24, 36, and 38, Hugo affirmed conditionals of the form “if
A, then not B” because the regions representing A and B had no overlap. For example, in turn 24
Hugo stated “So if acute then we’d be talking about anything outside of the if circle, so
everything outside of here, then it is not obtuse—right. ‘Cause you’re not—we’re talking about
everything except inside this circle. And obtuse is inside the circle. So that’d be true.” Rather
than invoking his subset relation meaning, Hugo put forth the notion that the empty intersection
between antecedent and consequent sets was also grounds for the declaration of truth. In this
utterance Hugo constructed the antecedent set by performing the complement action to obtain the
set of acute triangles. He then noted that it did not share any area with the consequent set (obtuse
triangles). Hugo interpreted “If a triangle is acute then it is not obtuse” by comparing the sets of
acute triangles and obtuse triangles. In doing so he used the “not” operator in the consequent to
ask whether acute triangles were all not in the set of obtuse triangles. This is a distinct though
equivalent condition to the subset meaning for this conditional. I refer to this as Hugo’s empty
intersection meaning for conditional truth. Through this turn, it seemed that Hugo was avoiding
reasoning about this statement in terms of a relation between two complement sets.
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Additionally, Hugo seemed to hold the belief that conditional statements only pertained
to the “if” cases. That is to say that Hugo believed these statements were only relevant to that
which satisfied the antecedent’s qualifying criteria. For example, in turn 36 he stated, “…if we
limited it to this inner circle—the obtuse triangles. Then obviously we would not be talking
about if it was outside of the circle. We’re only talking about the inside.” Conventional
mathematical logic does not hold this interpretation; conditionals are declared true even when
considering examples that do not satisfy the antecedent. Hugo also suggested this belief in turn
42; he stated, “…if I only talk about those—then is it not obtuse? Well yeah, I’m only talking
about acute. So…if I say if acute and I decide what triangles I’m talking about, and I’m not
worrying about what’s— not in my set…” This interpretation of “if,” as well as the linguistic
flexibility present in his treatment of “not,” seemed to have supported his empty intersection
meaning.
Hugo’s subset relation meaning, as it appeared throughout exchange 4, allowed him to
answer questions beyond the initial true/false prompt; it enabled him to identify an entire class of
counterexamples. This enhanced subset meaning bolstered his justifications in turns 13
(statement 6) and 21 (inverse statement of statement 7). In turn 13, Hugo considered the
containment of two sets and noted a failure to satisfy the subset relation meaning for conditional
truth; he noted a clear role reversal of the antecedent and consequent sets and concluded that the
statement was false. For his initial determination of the inverse of statement 7 in turn 21, Hugo
similarly invoked set containment, but this time to affirm the statement. Hugo’s subset relation
meaning seemed to have solidified as the exchange progressed, but when reaffirming the inverse
of statement 7 in turn 36 Hugo invoked his empty intersection meaning. When juxtaposed with
his initial explanation in turn 21, it becomes evident that Hugo’s capacity to affirm conditionals

51
had been enhanced. He now had two meanings for conditional truth available that he could call
upon to justify his determinations. I have no evidence that he was aware of the difference, or of
his frequent transitions, between them.
Claims about Hugo’s reasoning at the end of exchange 4:
• Hugo could reason about multiple statements with the same diagram.
• Hugo enacted meanings for conditional truth were set-based: subset relation meaning and
empty intersection meaning.
• Hugo could use both meanings to assign normative truth-values.
• Hugo’s counterexample condition for falsehood was incorporated into his subset relation
meaning.
• Hugo could articulate a generalizable set-based truth condition for his subset relation
meaning.
• Hugo constructed sets for the negation of categories via a complement action.
Hugo’s If-Then Coordination
I believe that Hugo’s coordination of the if and then designations with the sets of
mathematical objects and the statements’ truth-values, was critical in the construction of his setbased meanings. As Hugo’s subset meaning solidified through the second session, the
association between sets and their antecedent/consequent position came to the fore. Referring to
statements 2 through 5;
2. If a number is a multiple of 3, then it is a multiple of 6.
3. If a number is a multiple of 6, then it is a multiple of 3.
4. If a number is not a multiple of 6, then it is not a multiple of 3.
5. If a number is not a multiple of 3, then it is not a multiple of 6.,
Hugo and the teacher-researcher said the following:
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Exchange 5
(Session 4, 20:51.6-30:15.5)
H(1):

Two. The number is a multiple of 3. We got a circle—they’re all
multiples of 3—3, 6, 9, 12. Then it is a multiple of 6. [draws circle
around 6 and 12 in Figure 8].

Figure 8: Hugo’s diagram for statement 2 on left; researcher-reproduction on right.

I(2):
H(3):
I(4):
H(5):

Okay so is this true or false? So if it’s a multiple of 3, then it’s a
multiple of 6.
We said it was false because our set was this circle of multiples of 3,
and then if you only want multiples of 6—you have this but you still
have the 3 and the 9 which aren’t included in the little circle.
Okay, okay. What about the next one?
If the number is multiple of 6—I guess—we replace our—kind of
switch the “if” and “then”. If 6 times, then it’s multiple of 3. All of
these are multiples of 3. So we kind of switched “if” and “then”, but
we altered the inner circle a little bit. To include everything inside.
[see Figure 9]
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Figure 9: Hugo’s diagram for statement 3 on left; researcher-reproduction on right.

I(6):
H(7):
I(8):
H(9):
I(10):

Okay. So do you think this one should be true or false?
It would be true. ‘Cause if we’re talking about multiples of 6, well any
multiple of 6 is also a multiple of 3.
Yeah. Here’s what’s a little bothering me. ‘Cause you’re saying 3 and
9 are multiples of 6.
Ah. I see. That doesn’t work does it.
Let me go back. Let’s go back to your original picture. Okay, so your
original picture you had, 3, 6, 9, 12 [modifies Hugo’s original figure,
seen in Figure 10]—and what is the big circle representing?
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Figure 10: Jointly created diagram for statements 2-5 on left; researcher-reproduction on right.

H(11):
I(12):
H(13):
I(14):
H(15):
I(16):

When we talked about the first one?
Yeah.
It was multiples of 3.
Okay. What’s the little circle represent?
It was multiples of 6.
Okay. And does that change whether I call one part the if and one part
the then? Do you agree that these are multiples of 6?
H(17):
Right.
I(18):
And there’s more of them, right? But—
H(19):
If I change the title of this “if” to “then”—from “if” to “then”, or
“then” to “if”. No, the circles shouldn’t change.
[…][Hugo draws in arrows and writes ‘not 3x’ and not 6x’ in Figure 10]
I(20):
So just looking at this picture [Figure 10], What are the two statements
that are going to be true? Out of the four. Two of them are true, two of
them are false. Which ones are gonna be the ones that are true?
H(21):
If we talk about everything outside of the circle—is the small circle
not included?
I(22):
Okay, so if it is not a multiple of 3, then what?
H(23):
In order to make this true, if it’s not a multiple of 3, then it’s not a
multiple of 6.
I(24):
Okay. ‘Cause you’re saying it’s not in the middle here. Okay, what’s
the other statement that’s true?
H(25):
If it is a multiple of 6, then it is a multiple of 3. ‘Cause if we can only
talk about multiples of 6, those are all multiples of 3 because they’re
inside of our multiples of 3 circle.
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In turn 1 Hugo said, “The number is a multiple of 3. We got a circle—they’re all
multiples of 3—3, 6, 9, 12 [populates his diagram with these exemplars]. Then it is a multiple of
6. [draws circle around 6 and 12].” While reading this statement aloud, Hugo paused to construct
sets and then populate them with exemplars. After which, he labeled the sets “If 3x” and “then
6x” according to the sets’ positions in the statement. This illustrates Hugo’s recurrent process for
determining truth-values which involved 1) drawing a diagram representing the sets and their
positions in the statement, and 2) assessing whether there was a subset relation. Concluding this
process, Hugo invoked his subset relation meaning (which incorporated his counterexample
condition), by saying, “but you still have the 3 and the 9 which aren’t included in the little
circle.” This pattern of populating a diagram, and subsequently applying the subset criterion,
closely matched Hugo’s strategy for statement 3 (turn 14 exchange 2) on the previous day.
Hugo’s diagram was emergent in the sense that he needed to populate it with examples, and then
use the diagram to determine the relationship between the sets. I see this as distinct from his
production of Figure 5 in which he drew the diagram to express a relation he already observed
between the properties. There is a further distinction in what he used to stand in for the infinitely
many elements of each set. Hugo was content to let the property “90 degree triangles” (turn 7
exchange 4) stand in for all such triangles, whereas here he selected representative numbers to
stand in for the set of multiples of 6 and multiples of 3.
When Hugo shifted tasks in turn 5, he expanded the inner circle of his original diagram
(Figure 8) to include all his exemplars. This modification, which resulted in Figure 9, suggests
that Hugo associated the circles in his diagram simultaneously with the mathematical property
(6x) and the position in the statement (antecedent). Hugo used his now erroneous diagram to
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argue, “It would be true. ‘Cause if we’re talking about multiples of 6, well any multiple of 6 is
also a multiple of 3.” It is unclear whether Hugo was reasoning about the properties or the
diagram. Hugo did not use any of the spatial language that had been prevalent in his previous
determinations. Because of this absence, I posit that Hugo had switched to property-based
reasoning that drew upon on his knowledge of numbers and “being multiples.” He did not argue
that the multiples of 6 were a subset of or contained in the multiples of 3, but rather that any
chosen multiple of 6 will also have the property of being a multiple of 3 (i.e. he used property
entailment). It seems to be the case that Hugo’s determination was independent of his set
construction because his articulation in turn 7 did not refer to his diagram nor did he gesture to
his diagram. In this regard, Hugo was not reasoning with his. This seems contrary to the previous
exchange in which he correctly affirmed and negated, a statement, its converse, its inverse, and
its contrapositive with the same Euler diagram. How can we explain why Hugo’s activity on the
triangle items did not support abstracting the relationship between Euler diagrams related to pairs
of related conditionals? First, it appears Hugo’s interpretation of the two circles was tied to the
positions in the statement as well as to the categories they represent. Also, Hugo’s activity in
turns 5-7 suggests he had not yet coordinated how a syntactic transformation (from a conditional
to its converse) related to a diagrammatic transformation (like switching the “title” in turn 19).
Nonetheless, when the inconsistency between his diagram and his reporting was pointed out (in
turn 8), he readily acknowledged the invariant mathematical relationship between the multiples
of 6 and multiples of 3 (turns 14-19).
In the omitted portion of exchange 5 Hugo returned to the same mode of activity that
characterized exchange 4. His patterns of determination mimicked what he had done in exchange
4. Both false statements (2 and 4) were determined via his failure of subset criteria. Statement
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three was affirmed via his subset meaning for conditional truth and statement five was
determined true via his empty intersection meaning.
In concluding this exchange in turns 20-25, the teacher-researcher framed the task in a
new way: “So just looking at this picture, what are the two statements that are going to be true?”
(turn 20). This framing encouraged Hugo to produce true statements from a diagram that he had
constructed earlier, rather than using a diagram to determine truth-values of statements. When
reasoning from his diagram, Hugo readily invoked his empty intersection meaning when he
posed the question, “If we talk about everything outside of the circle [non-multiples of 3]—is the
small circle [multiples of 6] not included?” (turn 21). Hugo also clearly used his subset relation
meaning, when he stated, “Cause if we can only talk about multiples of 6, those are all multiples
of 3 because they’re inside of our multiples of 3 circle.” Note that in these concluding remarks
Hugo again used spatial language to refer to sets of objects, marking a return to diagrammatic
reasoning.
Claims about Hugo’s reasoning:
• Hugo alternated between property-based and set-based meanings for conditional truth.
• Hugo had not fully coordinated syntactic transformations (negating) with diagrammatic
transformations (complement).
• When prompted to assess multiple statements with the same diagram, Hugo flexibly and
accurately assessed the four related conditionals (original, inverse, converse, and
contrapositive). In so doing, he used the subset meaning to affirm one, the subset
meaning to deny two, and the empty intersection meaning to affirm another.
• Hugo could reason with a diagram to produce true conditional statements, which is a new
type of task.
Hugo’s Contrapositive Equivalence
The interviewer intended for the subset relation to support participants’ reinvention of
contrapositive equivalence. When first directed to consider this equivalence with statement six
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and the inverse of statement seven (i.e., statement six’s contrapositive) he replied with, “I mean
it’s the same structure. We’re just replacing acute with obtuse, and obtuse with acute. I don’t
know how that relationship would be described.” In this instance Hugo observed a syntactic
pattern, but not the composed inverse-converse transformation of the statement. The
transformation Hugo proposed accurately connected the contrapositive pair of statements
because one condition was positive and one was negative. In the absence of the intermediate step
of inverting or converting, it seems a reasonable observation on his part. The teacher-researcher
guided Hugo to consider the normatively understood relationship between contrapositive
statements:
Exchange 6
(Session 4, 31:32.4-38:53.6)
I(1):
H(2):
I(3):
H(4):
I(5):
H(6):
I(7):
H(8):

Okay. So then to go from 3 to 5, what would be done?
They switched [converse] and we’ve done the inverse.
Okay, okay. We don’t have a name if they switch and inverse.
But if we have an if-then statement that’s true, we take the inverse and
the switch—we switch it and take the inverse, then—so far we’ve
proved that it would be true.
Okay, but why do you say that? […] Are you just observing that, that
happens in these two?
Well I’m observing but I’m trying to articulate why that is.
Okay. That is a good question.
So if we go back to these ones [referring to Figure 11], you were
trying to look at a relationship between—the inside statements and the
outside statements. I guess those would be a switch and inverse. Their
relationship would be both a switch and an inverse. As well as the
outside ones—switch and took the inverse.
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Figure 11: Hugo’s syntactic relations between statements 6, 7, and their respective inverses on
top; researcher-reproduction on bottom.

I(9):

Okay. So—I agree. […] And what do you notice about the truthvalues?
H(10):
If I switch and inverse, the truth value remains the same.
[…] (banter; introduced the term contrapositive)
I(11):
Okay. […] Let’s see, so number 10 for instance, quadrilateral is a
rectangle, then is a parallelogram. Is a true statement. So we’re saying,
if a rectangle, then parallelogram. I should use more words but you get
the prompt.
H(12):
Yeah.
I(13):
That’s true. What would be the contrapositive?
H(14):
If not a parallelogram,—then not a rectangle. [writes this statement on
white board] So we switched and inversed.
I(15):
Okay. So do you agree just looking—thinking about this as a new
statement, do you agree that this new one is true, or is it false?
H(16):
If it is not a parallelogram, which means opposite sides are parallel,
then yeah that’s not going to be a rectangle. You could come up with
a—[draws Figure 12]—opposites are—that’s not a rectangle.
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Figure 12: Hugo’s non-rectangular quadrilateral on left; researcher-reproduction on right.

I(17):
H(18):
I(19):
H(20):
I(21):
H(22):
I(23):
H(24):
I(25):
H(26):

Okay. I agree completely.
The opposite sides are not parallel and that’s definitely not a rectangle.
Okay. So why was this one true [statement #10]?
If we only talk about a rectangle—[draws canonical rectangle]—the
definition of a rectangle is that all the angles inside are 90 degrees.
Which—means that opposite sides are going to be parallel.
Okay, so if I have a rectangle, I have to have parallel sides. You’re
claiming, if I don’t have parallel sides, then by golly it’s not a
rectangle.
Right.
So does that—okay, so I don’t know, is that illuminating? Why does it
seem like these two are in fact—?
If we take everything that’s—if we talk about—not—not our answer—
What are you thinking just now?
I’m thinking if we talk, using other words, if we talk about this is a
circle and this is a circle [draws diagram in Figure 13], and whatever
we are talking about is inside that circle. We take everything outside of
that circle and make that our set, and take everything that’s the outside
of that circle and make it our—restriction. Then that’s also going to be
true.
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Figure 13: Hugo’s diagram for statement 10 and its contrapositive on top; researcherreproduction on bottom.

I(27):

Okay, why don’t we do it this way. Let’s draw the picture this way
[Figure 14]. So we know—because this is true, one set is contained in
the other. Right?

Figure 14: Adapted diagrams for statement 10 and its contrapositive on top; researcherreproduction on bottom.
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H(28):
I(29):
H(30):
I(31):
H(32):
I(33):
H(34):
I(35):

H(36):
I(37):
H(38):
I(39):
H(40):
I(41):
H(42):

Right.
So what’s the rectangle? What part of this picture should be the
rectangles?
Should be the blue, or I’m sorry, the red circle.
And what part of this picture should be the parallelograms?
Should be the black circle.
What’s going be then, in the same sort of picture, if these are the
rectangles and these are the parallelograms, what’s going to be the not
parallelograms? Where do they—point.
Not parallelograms would be the little circle.
No, no. Try to use the same convention [as in top two diagrams in
Figure 14]. In other words, if the little circle inside is rectangles, and
the bigger circle outside parallelograms, what’s going to be the not
parallelograms?
They’re going to be outside of the circle [draws arrows on bottom right
diagram in Figure 14].
Okay, and what’s going to be the not rectangles?
So rectangles is the little circle, so everything outside of the little
circle. Inside the big circle and outside of the big circle.
So, is it true that all of the stuff outside of the big circle—is also
outside of the little circle?
Yes.
So if it’s non-parallelogram, is it non-rectangle?
Yes. We’re talking about only outside the circle—well yeah, we still
have that over here. So it’d be true.

Hugo opened this exchange (turns 1-10) by acknowledging contrapositive equivalence.
Hugo observed that a pair of contrapositive statements (“the inside statements and the outside
statements,” turn 8) were related by a composition of syntactic transformations (“switch” and
inverse). He also made the empirical generalization: “we switch it and take the inverse, then—so
far we’ve proved that it would be true...Well I’m observing but I’m trying to articulate why that
is.” (turns 4-6). Hugo noted a pattern in the statements’ truth-values and a relationship between
the syntax of the statements. However, he could not explain, or justify, why such a relationship
exists.
After shifting the discussion to a new statement (Statement 10: If a number is not a
multiple of 3, then it is not a multiple of 6.), Hugo used his property-based meaning for
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conditional truth to make determinations. After producing statement 10’s contrapositive, Hugo
said, “If it is not a parallelogram, which means opposite sides are parallel, then yeah that’s not
going to be a rectangle. You could come up with a—opposites are—that’s not a rectangle,”
(Figure 12, turn 16). Hugo semantically unpacked “not a parallelogram” and produced an
illustrative example to affirm the statement. Returning to reassess statement 10’s truth-value
Hugo said, “If we only talk about a rectangle—the definition of a rectangle is that all the angles
inside are 90 degrees. Which—means that opposite sides are going to be parallel,” (turn 20).
Hugo again relied on the semantic properties of the statement to produce a simple proof that
affirmed the statement. In this familiar semantic context, Hugo could use property relationship to
argue why a conditional statement and its contrapositive were each true. He thus affirmed the
claim as a warranted conditional (Weber & Alcock, 2005) meaning that the consequent
condition can be inferred from the antecedent condition. These property-based inferences seem
absent of any of the reasoning with diagrams he used prior. Hugo’s language contained more
geometric property terms rather than the spatial language observed in exchange 5 and the latter
part of exchange 4.
When Hugo was asked, “is that illuminating? Why does it seem like these two are in fact
[equivalent]—?” (turn 23), he lacked a way to explicate contrapositive equivalence using his
property-based reasoning. While further responding to this question, Hugo spontaneously began
to use spatial language (“inside that circle,” “outside of that circle”), and produced a new type of
diagram (in turn 26). This constituted a new form of matching the circle diagram with the
sentential structure. In this case, he did not label the circles “if” and “then,” but rather, drew the
circles in positions to match the left-to-right structure of the sentence. The objects that composed
each set were implied based on the word they were written above (see Figure 13). Despite this
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new activity, Hugo’s reasoning still seemed consistent because he could argue for the
contrapositive’s equivalent truth-value. During his explanation, he again invoked a “restriction”
metaphor. He used this metaphor to say that if we only talk about what is in the left circle
(rectangles), then those things are in the right circle (parallelograms). If we were restricted to
outside the right circle (not parallelograms) for the contrapositive, then we were not in the left
circle (rectangles). It remains unclear whether Hugo imagined the left circle as implicitly inside
the right circle or whether he was in no way using topology to represent the subset relation. Also,
it is unclear on what basis he made his argument for the contrapositive in turn 26, from
properties or the imagined diagrammatic relations. When he first responded to the “illuminating”
prompt, he interestingly referred to the consequent condition as “our answer,” (turn 24). This
implicit metaphor of question-and-answer may suggest that Hugo also perceived a temporal, or
traveling, quality with respect to the relationship between the two circles (which were mapped to
parts of the sentence) in his diagram. In this metaphor, one would start with the antecedent
condition and somehow “go to” the consequent condition, rather than consider an invariant
relationship between the set of rectangles and the set of parallelograms. Ultimately, there is not
enough data in this exchange to clearly model how Hugo perceived the relationship between the
two circles that he mapped to the sentence. Like exchange 5, this interchange demonstrated that
Hugo’s understanding of the circles in the diagram and how they related to the properties and the
positions in the various conditionals was still in flux.
After Hugo’s spontaneous shift in diagram use, the teacher-researcher intervened to adapt
his two diagrams to the familiar Euler diagram, which uses topology to relate the conditions (turn
27, Figure 14). While identifying what each region in the diagrams represented (in turns 29-34),
Hugo constructed a new diagram for the contrapositive (“not parallelograms would be the little
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circle,” turn 34) rather than reason with the existing diagram. As two separate statements (though
pertaining to the same mathematical properties), Hugo was seemingly compelled to carry out his
recurrent process for determining truth-values: 1) draw a diagram representing the sets and their
positions in the statement, and 2) assess whether there was a subset relation. This further
suggests that Hugo did not coordinate between the syntactic transformations (inverse and
converse) and diagrammatic relations (complements and focusing on new regions). This despite
having analyzed multiple conditional-contrapositive pairs with Euler diagrams already. With
very direct prompting, and redirecting, Hugo reaffirmed the original conditional (turn 27-28),
and perhaps the contrapositive (turn 39-40) via the subset meaning. Hugo’s final rephrasing,
“Yes. We’re talking about only outside the circle—well yeah, we still have that over here. So it’d
be true,” (turn 42) does not clearly indicate what type of meaning supported his conclusion. It is
unclear whether he acknowledged a subset relation between two complement sets or used the
empty intersection meaning he previously employed. Hugo’s phrase, “we still have that over
here” may further indicate that Hugo perceived a temporal quality between his two diagrams,
similar to a “before” and “after” picture comparison.
Claims about Hugo’s reasoning:
• Hugo understood the contrapositive as the composition of two syntactic transformations
(converse and inverse).
• Hugo alternatively used set-based and property-based meanings to assign truth-values.
• Hugo constructed complement sets using the ‘not’ operator; though this time with more
direct prompting.
• We do not have clear evidence of him reasoning about both negations in the
contrapositive via a complement relation.
• Despite using an Euler diagram to make determinations about multiple conditionalcontrapositive pairs, Hugo’s use of the diagrams was still in flux. The two circles
continued to simultaneously refer to the positions in the statements as well as the
categories of objects referred to in the statements.

66
By the end of exchange 6, and the second session on conditionals, I do not have clear
evidence that Hugo understood how the subset meaning (or the empty intersection meaning)
could be used to justify general contrapositive equivalence. The equivalence relationship
resurfaced during the third, and final session of working with conditionals. After her absence for
the second session, Elya returned for next session to work alongside Hugo. On the final day of
conditionals leading up to this exchange, Hugo and Elya successfully produced the four related
conditionals with statement nine as the “original.” They identified these statements by the
syntactic transformation required to create them (e.g., switch, inverse, contrapositive). With the
guidance of the teacher-researcher, Hugo and Elya observed that two statement pairs –
original/contrapositive and switch/inverse – shared truth-values regardless of which statement is
labeled “original.” Hugo and Elya agreed that the relationship between the pairs of statements
was important; the labeling was inconsequential. They constructed the statements as seen in
Figure 15 and identified what mathematical categories were represented by each region when
constructing the diagram in Figure 16. The teacher-researcher turned their attention to explaining
why such an equivalence relation would “make sense”:
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Exchange 7
(Session 5, 10:1.9-13:57.0)

Switch
Orig
Contrap
Inverse

If a quad is a rectangle, then it is a square.
square
rectangle
not rectangle
not square
not square
not rectangle

F
T
T
F

Figure 15: Hugo & Elya’s statement 9 and its related statements on top; researcher-reproduction
on bottom.

Figure 16: Hugo & Elya’s Euler diagram for statement 9 and its related statements on left;
researcher-reproduction on right.
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I(1):
E(2):

I(3):
H(4):

I(5):
E(6):
I(7):
E(8):
I(9):
H(10):
I(11):

E(12):

I(13):

Okay. So one question is, can we argue, why would it be the case, I
think Hugo, last time, when he said it looks like contrapositives have
the same truth value, can we argue why that would be true?
Well, ‘cause for the like, this original [points to the statement: If a
quadrilateral is a square, then it is a rectangle.] it’s a square. [referring
to diagram, jointly created with Hugo, displayed in Figure 16] It’s like
going out, [points with sweeping motion away from square region] and
it has to be a rectangle. ‘Cause they’re [the “squares” and the
“rectangles”] in the same box, but then—not a rectangle would be all
the way out here [points to outside of “rectangle box”] so it can’t be
what’s inside. So it [the contrapositive of “this original”] would also
be true. So like it’s going to have the same relationship where it’s
going—
Go ahead Hugo, what do you think?
Trying to put it into words but it’s kind of like we’re talking about the
opposite area inside the big rectangle, or quadrilateral box. So like—it
is a square [points to “square” region], and are rectangles, so we’re
talking about this [points to “square” region] and then if it’s not a
rectangle we’re talking about the opposite area [sweeps hand outward
over the complement of the rectangle region].
And what region of the—so the way you explained it Elya, you said if
it’s not a rectangle, which I agree is sort of the outside, and you’re
saying it can’t be the square. Right? It’s not inside this.
Right, it can’t be because that’s inside of the box.
What section of this diagram though actually corresponds to this part?
Right. So—
Everything out here [sweeps her hands outward over the complement
of the square region].
Because originally, what was the claim though, we said when was an
if-then true. What should be true of the two regions for the if-then?
The if should be inside the then.
Okay and sure enough that’s true. Right. So the squares are kind of
inside the rectangles. So can I apply that same—because it seems to be
different when you say well if it’s not a rectangle, then that means it’s
not inside of this circle. There you’re not showing one is a subset—
like is kind of contained in the other. You’re saying this and this are
kind of separate.
This one’s not contained in this [points to complement of rectangle
region with two open palms] because there’s all this [points to region
outside of “square” and inside “rectangle” with sweeping motion] as
well.
Sorry, say it again.
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E(14):
I(15):
E(16):
I(17):
E(18):
I(19):
E(20):
I(21):
E(22):
I(23):
H(24):
E(25):
H(26):

Because—so this [sweeping hands over the complement of
‘rectangle’] like—not a square is not contained in not a rectangle.
Okay.
Because there’s still other rectangles [points to region outside of
“square” and inside “rectangle” with sweeping motion].
Not a square is not contained in not a rectangle. So this statement [the
contrapositive of statement 9] is false. What are we saying about the
contrapositive [inverse of statement 9] that makes it true?
Well, not a rectangle [sweeps her hands outward over the complement
of the rectangle region] is contained in not a square [sweeps pointed
finger outward over the complement of the square region].
Because what region, can you mark for me, what region is not a
square?
Not a square?
What region—?
Is everything from here out [draws arrow away from “square” in
Figure 16]—is not a square.
What do you think, Hugo?
Yeah. Then not a rectangle, [draws arrow away from “rectangle” in
Figure 16] would be out here.
So then it—[facing diagram on board] not rectangles are contained in
the not squares.
It’s kind of like the blue one [traces arrow with finger] is a head start
on—the square has to go through [traces portion of arrow outside of
“square” and inside “rectangle” with finger] all this area. So it’s
always past, it’s always a little farther out.

In turn 4, Hugo attempted to explain contrapositive equivalence using spatial language
and his empty intersection meaning. Hugo constructed the complement set of non-rectangles and
confirmed that this region was disjoint from the square region. Hugo’s seemingly fluent
explanation of conditional truth (using his empty intersection meaning) in turn 4 stands in
contrast to his next utterance in turn 10, in which he reiterated his general subset meaning for
conditional truth. Hugo shifted between meanings without recognizing he had done so.
Having reiterated his subset meaning, I find it curious that Hugo did not affirm the
contrapositive via the subset meaning as Elya did (turns 18-25). In turn 26, Hugo attempted to
elaborate on Elya’s subset meaning explanation. By using phrases such as “head start,” “always
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past,” and “farther out,” his explanation again suggested a dynamic (i.e., involving motion)
interpretation of the diagram. Hugo’s explanation used spatial language as before, but it now
exhibited a temporal aspect. This raises the question as to whether he understood Elya’s
justification. Elya’s gestures and arrows were meant to specify a region of quadrilaterals in the
diagram. Hugo seemed to construe them to indicate movement of the boundaries or regions
themselves. He explained that the square had “to go through all this area” (turn 26). This also
supports the claim that Hugo continued to conflate the regions in the diagram with the positions
in the sentence. This is because shifting the original statement to the contrapositive statement
seemed to entail moving the squares to a different region in the diagram.
Exchange 7 revolved around the notion of contrapositive equivalence, and Hugo’s
attempted reinvention was ambiguous. It seems to be that Hugo did not see a logical necessity
(Simon, 2013, 2017) for the truth of the contrapositive given the truth of the original statement.
He believed the equivalence inductively (exchange 6, turn 6), and could affirm it for specific
statements by using his empty intersection meaning. However, he did not seem to express the
logical necessity that Elya did on both the first day of working with conditionals and in the latter
part of this exchange. This lack of logical necessity may also relate to the fact that he did not
seem to recognize when he shifted between his subset and empty intersection meanings for
conditional truth.
Claims about Hugo’s reasoning:
• Hugo affirmed contrapositive statements using his empty intersection meaning.
• Hugo unconsciously shifted between his empty intersection and subset meanings for
conditional truth.
• Hugo could construct complement sets using the ‘not’ operator, though this exchange
suggests a dynamic component in his interpretation.
• We do not have clear evidence of him reasoning about both negations in the
contrapositive as complement sets with a subset relation.

•
•
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Hugo had not fully coordinated syntactic transformations (negating) with diagrammatic
transformations (complement).
Hugo did not express a logical necessity in justifying contrapositive equivalence.
This chapter presented a vast collection of results and analysis that illustrate Hugo’s

shifting meanings for conditional truth. Hugo’s activity which preceded set-based meanings
displayed a preference for thinking with explicit examples. Hugo’s normative determinations on
his initial run-through must not be overlooked. With teacher-researcher guidance, Hugo’s
attention shifted to consider sets of mathematical objects in his determinations. During this time
of set-based meaning formation, Hugo displayed the researcher-anticipated subset meaning.
However, unexpectedly, Hugo also developed a logically equivalent empty-intersection meaning
for conditional truth. In this chapter I have pointed out Hugo’s flexible, though unconsciously
shifting, use of multiple, and evolving meanings (namely the subset meaning and its relation to
the counterexample notion). I also pointed out weaknesses in Hugo’s coordination between
negation and the complement action, and his consistent use of property-based strategies that were
at times complicating factors.
In the next chapter I will present a framework for mathematical logic learning that is
grounded in the preceding results and accompanying analysis. This framework grew out patterns
of observation in Hugo’s activity. I will also apply this framework to model Hugo’s development
in a succinct way that can be pedagogically and analytically informative.

CHAPTER 5
FRAMEWORK FOR MATHEMATICAL LOGIC LEARNING
After addressing the questions: 1) How do students interpret (mathematical) conditional
statements? and 2) What understandings do students construct while interpreting such
statements? in the previous results chapter, I will now address the third research question: How
can students’ constructive activity inform a pedagogically and analytically operational
developmental framework? Analysis of Hugo’s reinvention of truth-functional logic, namely that
of conditional truth, has given rise to a framework that captures his learning process. Little
research has been devoted to mathematical logic learning as a constructive process rooted in
student activity (namely conscious reflection). In this section, I propose a logic learning
framework that may contribute to a more refined Local Instruction Theory (LIT) for the guided
reinvention of truth-functional logic. Within this framework I distinguish three levels of logic
learning that grew out of observations of Hugo’s and Elya’s activity. And finally I overlay this
framework to revisit Hugo’s learning.
In general, the tasks that Hugo confronted dealt with reading a mathematical conditional
statement, interpreting the statement, and then determining the truth-value of the statement. The
mathematical content of each statement was familiar to students; the study of integers and basic
Euclidean geometry shapes are dispersed throughout the typical K-12 curriculum. The selection
of mathematical topics was done so that participants’ learning would be focused on that of
mathematical logic (as opposed to mathematical content). The guidance that Hugo and the other
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participants received in this study was directed at clarifying their questions of mathematical
content, and redirecting them to more closely consider their interpretations of the statements.
That is not to say that the role of the content was trivial. The representations by which the
students reasoned about the mathematical content has been shown to be important to their
developing reasoning. Based on the results of Dawkins and Cook (2016), this study intended to
direct students toward the use of set-based representations of mathematical categories because of
its anticipated affordances in developing logical structure. The nature of students’ interpretations
became evident through the analysis of their speech and the artifacts they created. Participants’
interpretive actions revealed what representational strategies (for brevity I will simply use
“representations” going forward) were available to them (consciously or not) as they worked to
make sense of the statements and reach determinations. Students’ enacted meanings for
conditional truth were embedded within this read-interpret-determine chain of action.
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Mathematical Logic Learning Framework
I propose, in Figure 17, a schematic model to describe the activity of mathematical logic
learning:

Figure 17: Schematic of logic learning.

The horizontal progression of solid arrows (task to representation to meaning) typifies a
normal progression of activity; the student confronts a task, forms some representation (internal
or external) to make sense of the task, and then enacts meaning as they make determinations.
Initially, students have a propensity to attend to the “meaning of the statement” rather than the
“meaning of conditional truth.” However, attending to these two in tandem is a goal of the
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instruction. Although, in Figure 17, I am primarily concerned with the “meaning of conditional
truth.” From the researcher perspective, these meanings are inferred based on the explicit or
implicit criteria students use to make determinations. For instance, a student may cite a
counterexample while the conditions for being a counterexample are implicit or they may
explicitly acknowledge that it is a counterexample because it satisfies the antecedent but not the
consequent.
The diagonal solid arrows indicate alternative “readings” of the statement. They capture
when a student adjusts the perspective from which they interpret a statement. They may
construct an alternative representation of the statement’s content or introduce a different meaning
by which they could make a determination. In this way, students may assign the correct truthvalues to the same statement by various task-representation-meaning chains. For instance, Hugo
shifted between diagrammatic reasoning and property-based reasoning without attending to the
shift in representation. In another case, Hugo reinterpreted his counterexamples as a failure to
satisfy a subset relation, which constituted a different meaning for the same representation.
Students may not notice when they shift meanings, as when Hugo affirmed one statement by a
subset meaning and another by an empty intersection meaning. I use the term within-task vertical
coordination to refer to students’ reflection, and action, on the relations between representations
or meanings for the same task. This is represented in Figure 17 by vertical dotted arrows in the
right two columns.
To systematize their use of mathematical language, students in this study were also
expected to make connections between related statements and their representations (specifically
contrapositive statements). This constitutes another form of vertical coordination, which I shall
call across-task vertical coordination. This is represented in Figure 17 by the left-most vertical
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dotted arrows and by the convergence of diagonal arrows. The latter coordination is embedded
into the diagram because the student may use a single representation for multiple tasks. I contend
that the primary coordinating between tasks entails relating statements by syntactic
transformations (e.g., inverse, converse, contrapositive). By relating statements through syntactic
observations, students are at least implicitly recognizing that related statements pertain to the
same mathematical objects. Coordinating representations is intended to include making
connections between mental and/or visual representations. While mental representations may be
inferred by the researcher, the visual representations in this study primarily took the form of
examples and Euler diagrams produced by the student. Coordinating Euler diagrams may entail
relating two diagrams from alternative task-representation-meaning chains via topological
transformations (within-task coordination) or analyzing different statement tasks via the same
diagram (across-task coordination). Lastly, the coordination between logical mathematical
meanings may be more useful to think of as a merging, or encapsulating, of two meanings into a
new emerging meaning. This coordination could occur within- or across-tasks. I propose that two
meanings can be encapsulated if some degree of coordination has been done between
representations. For instance, Hugo was able to connect the set-based relation that the antecedent
set was not a subset of the consequent set to the counterexample meaning (finding an example
that satisfied the antecedent and not the consequent). He pointed out that an entire region of one
of his diagrams represented counterexamples to a conditional.
Attending to syntactic transformations between statements (like inverse and converse)
and diagrammatic transformations (like the complement relation) are necessary steps to afford
further degrees of coordination, which I shall call horizontal coordination. The dashed, doubleheaded horizontal arrows indicate this second-order type of coordination: coordinating
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relationships between tasks and between representations. In this study, this included arguing why
a contrapositive conditional must be true given that the original is true according to the subset
meaning. I present this horizontal coordination as indicative of more sophisticated mathematical
logic learning. This study, and in particular this framework of mathematical logic learning,
prompts two questions: 1) How can we distinguish qualitatively different levels of what it means
to learn mathematical logic? 2) What is an analytically and pedagogically operational
progression through these levels?
Levels of Mathematical Logic Learning
I propose that mathematical logic learning is characterized by coordinating across tasks,
representations, and meanings, as represented by the double-headed arrows in Figure 17. With
this perspective, I regard high quality logic learning to be a rich web connecting varied tasks,
representations, and meanings. I distinguish three levels of mathematical logic learning. For the
following discussion on levels of logic learning, consider the following statements:
1) If a quadrilateral is a rectangle, then it is a parallelogram.
2) If a quadrilateral is a parallelogram, then it is a rectangle.
3) If a quadrilateral is not a rectangle, then it is not a parallelogram.
4) If a quadrilateral is not a parallelogram, then it is not a rectangle.
Level 1: Reading
The first level of mathematical logic learning I will call the reading level. At the reading
level, the competent student exhibits a productive task-representation-meaning chain and
determines the normative truth-value for a given statement. I do not assume any productive
coordination between tasks, representations, or meanings occurs at this level. Prior studies

78
demonstrate that many students assign non-normative truth-values to common mathematical
statements either due to misunderstandings of the mathematical content or unproductive
meanings (e.g., Dawkins & Cook, 2017; Epp, 2003). This suggests that reading is an important
level of learning mathematical logic and some prior studies only assess students’ enacted
representations and meanings. Whether students produced normative determinations or not, they
frequently began the task sequences in this study by choosing truth-values for each statement
separately. Whether or not their representations and meanings are consistent across tasks, I call
this parallel activity. This is because the task-representation-meaning chains occur in parallel
and students do not yet engage in vertical or horizontal connection (i.e. double-headed vertical
arrows). This level of learning is largely characterized by unidirectional horizontal activity (as
represented in Figure 17). What students need to learn at this stage is how to find, and construct,
representations and meanings that are compatible with mathematical practice and thus produce
normative determinations. For instance, the activity of a student at this level may be as follows:
Student A: (Regarding statement 1) “If a quadrilateral is a rectangle, it has four
right angles. Since the sum of two consecutive (or same side interior) angles is
180, the opposite sides are parallel. This is the case for each pair of consecutive
angles so the quadrilateral must a parallelogram.”
Hugo exhibited a similar unidirectional chain of action regarding this statement in exchange 6,
turn 20. A second instance of reading that might follow the above articulation, and illustrate
parallel activity, is as follows:
Student A: (Regarding statement 2) “False, because a generic (non-rectangle)
parallelogram does not have to be a rectangle” (i.e. produced counterexample).
Hugo and Elya made a similar statement to this on the final session of working with conditionals.
These two hypothetical chains of activity reach normative determinations, but do not
demonstrate any connecting, either syntactically or representationally. While some students may
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need to learn to produce such chains of reasoning to interpret the statement appropriately, if they
stand unconnected they bear no insight on the logical structure that relates the two statements.
Level 2: Connecting
The second level of mathematical logic learning that I distinguish is the connecting level.
At the connecting level, students draw connections between tasks, representations, and
meanings. This type of activity is represented primarily by the dotted vertical arrows in Figure
17. This level encompasses a breadth of activity because of the varying degrees of connecting
and coordinating that students can exhibited. These varying degrees of connecting apply to both
within-task and across-task vertical coordination. For instance, the activity of a student at this
level may be as follows:
Student B: (Regarding statement 1) “If you consider all parallelograms, that
includes rectangles and generic parallelograms. So if you draw a circle and that’s
all the parallelograms. You can draw a circle inside that around all the rectangles.
So if you have a rectangle it must be a parallelogram because it’s inside of it.”
(Regarding statement 2) “This is like the previous statement but the if part and
then part are switched. So in this situation, when you have a parallelogram it
doesn’t have to be a rectangle. It could just be a generic parallelogram. So like in
the same picture; inside the parallelogram circle, but outside the rectangle circle.
So that’s false.”
This hypothetical activity, which demonstrates both within- and across-task vertical
coordination, bears some resemblance to that which Hugo exhibited in exchange 5, turns 1-19. In
general, connecting level activity may be marked by comparing statements’ syntax and with
related regions in Euler diagrams (within-task coordination). There are multiple connections to
be made between tasks and between representations, and I am not claiming that all such
connections occur simultaneously. For instance, the reasoning above does not require any
attention to (syntactic) negations or (diagrammatic) complements. If a student were then able to
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coordinate the not operator and the complement relation, this would be more consistent with
horizontal coordination.
Level 3: Fluency
The third, and final, level of learning that I distinguish is the fluency level. At this level,
students fluidly connect tasks, move between and connect representations, and exhibit logical
control over the meanings they invoke. In this study, this includes making normative
determinations, connecting statements via syntactic transformations, connecting representations
(property-based to set-based, and set-based to set-based across tasks), and further connecting
syntactic transformation with diagrammatic transformations. I call this level “fluency” because
some of the distinctions between example, property, and set-based reasoning become superfluous
for experts who can coordinate each representation as referring to the same fundamental class of
objects. This type activity, rich with connections from the second level, may appear condensed in
this framework because the elements joined by connections are essentially unified. For instance,
an expert reasoning about mathematics does not distinguish the property “not-rectangular” from
the complement of the set of rectangles, since one readily refers to the other. I will continue the
hypothetical activity of Student B to illustrate:
Student B: (Regarding statement 3) “This is the inverse of #1. Both the if and the
then are negated. So ‘not a rectangle’ would be everything outside of this interior
circle [rectangles]. This may be a parallelogram with non-right angles or a
quadrilateral with non-parallel sides. So if you’re not a rectangle you could still be
a parallelogram. Kind of like statement 2 when it could be true but it doesn’t have
to be. So the statement is false. The middle region of non-rectangular
parallelograms contains all counterexamples.” (Regarding statement 4) “So this is
the switch and the inverse of the first statement. So looking at the same picture; if
you’re outside of the parallelogram circle you can’t be inside the rectangle circle.
Or, since ‘not rectangle’ is everything outside of the interior circle, if you’re
outside the parallelogram you’re a part of ‘not rectangle.’ So the nonparallelograms are contained in the non-rectangles. This makes sense because if
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you don’t have parallel sides, you must have either acute or obtuse angles. Either
way it’s true.”
This hypothetical activity, in many ways, is similar to how Elya acted in exchange 7, turns 2-25.
Student B understands these statements to be well-connected syntactically and uses one Euler
diagram to justify all determinations. In addition, the transitions between statements are fluid,
and the ability to adjust and compare meanings for conditional truth suggests logical control. The
explanation also portrays how students might be able to fluently coordinate diagrammatic and
semantic explanations connecting the different representations. Activity such as this suggests that
tasks and representations are coordinated both vertically and horizontally, and that the student is
consciously aware of their criteria for truth.
Placing Hugo’s Learning in this Framework
How one defines the levels of mathematical logic learning influences the type of activity
one expects “successful” students to demonstrate. If one focuses on making normative
determinations (the reading level) as the target level of ‘logic learning,’ then Hugo proved quite
proficient from the onset. He and his partner reached normative truth-value determinations for all
statements on the first read-through. This level of analysis, though, does not allow us to account
for subtle differences between the two students’ strategies. One student (Elya) in the teaching
experiment reached normative determinations by using more consistent representations and
meanings, while the other (Hugo) did so using varied representations and meanings.
Furthermore, some non-normative determinations were made for a number of reasons. Certainly,
making normative determinations is a necessary condition for logic learning, and one that is
pertinent to students’ mathematical practice, but it is not sufficient to account for the range of
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learning that was observed in this teaching experiment. If one shifts the goals of logic learning to
include the use of multiple representations, then Hugo became relatively proficient in this type of
activity during the experiment. He began using example- and property-based representations and
developed set-based representations and meanings. Next, if we focus on logic learning as
building connections among tasks, representations, and meanings (the connecting level), then we
see Hugo’s learning as emergent over the course of the study. He certainly made progress at
drawing connections by interpreting different tasks using the same diagrams, but he never
reached fluency. Hugo’s construction of relationships at the connecting level (namely,
coordinating syntactic transformations with diagrammatic transformations) was insufficient. By
considering Hugo’s learning within this framework, I have identified areas of Hugo’s reinvention
that were rich with relationship building, and also areas that lacked coordination and proved to
be less propitious.
Framework Applied to Exchange 4
Let us first consider Hugo’s learning as presented in exchange 4. The following
schematic represents my model of Hugo’s activity, coding all actions and connections that could
be discerned from his utterances, inscriptions, and gestures:
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Figure 18: Hugo’s mathematical logic learning in exchange 4 (*denotes enhanced subset
meaning).
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From this figure we can see that Hugo was able to coordinate tasks, representations, and
meanings as various times. Hugo coordinated these tasks as pairs (a statement and its inverse).
He constructed inverse statements via syntactic transformation. With prominent guidance, Hugo
coordinated his example-based and set-based representations for statement six, and successfully
encapsulated his subset relation meaning for conditional truth and his counterexample condition
for falsehood into an enhanced subset relation meaning (denoted Subset*). I call this the
enhanced subset meaning because it constituted both a sufficient and necessary criterion for
conditional truth (it could establish truth and falsehood). Regarding statement six, Hugo initially
said, “it was false ‘cause our first set included right [tri]angles…So it could have been a right
triangle or obtuse. Not just obtuse. So it limited us. Which is why we said it was false.” He was
clearly thinking about sets of triangles sharing familiar properties, and the relations between
those sets from the beginning. After constructing diagrams with the guidance of the teacherresearcher, Hugo reiterated the falsehood of the statement by declaring, “That the then does not
encase the if. The if encases the then.” This is an explicit and generalizable explanation of a
failure to satisfy the subset criterion for conditional truth. In his next utterance, he determined
that the counterexample to the statement was, “the 90 degree triangle because if it’s not acute it
could still be a 90 degree [triangle], but…that’s still not obtuse.” In this dialogue Hugo linked his
counterexample condition for falsehood with his subset relation meaning for conditional truth,
thus resulting in an enhanced meaning for conditional falsehood. The corresponding area in
Figure 18 is relatively rich in relationships.
Hugo related statement seven and its inverse via syntactic transformations, and related
their representations via the complement action with the same diagram. However, Hugo seemed
to lack coordination between his meanings since he spontaneously reaffirmed statement seven
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using his empty intersection meaning. Although Hugo could relate representations using the
complement relation, he was inconsistent in how he interpreted negations and conditional truth
and seemed unaware of these shifts. This suggests his meanings were not stable enough to
support coordination between his empty intersection and subset meanings. While this did not
affect the validity of his truth-value determinations, this may have foreshadowed some of his
difficulties in justifying contrapositive equivalence. Furthermore, Hugo had not characterized the
contrapositive relationship as a composition of syntactic transformations in this exchange
(though he did later in exchange 6). Nonetheless, by my characterization, Hugo was competent
in the reading level of logic and was constructing some useful tools for connecting logic.
Framework Applied to Exchange 5
In exchange 5, I presented dialogue that coincided with a shift in Hugo’s activity (when
compared to exchange 4). The schematic below, in Figure 19, illustrates Hugo’s activity as he
was further guided to recreate an understanding of conditional truth.

86

Figure 19: Hugo’s mathematical logic learning in exchange 5.

In the beginning of exchange 5, Hugo readily applied his enhanced subset meaning
(Subset*) with a familiar Euler diagram to determine statement two’s falsehood. However,
Hugo’s mode of activity shifted when working with statement three. Hugo appropriately
observed a syntactic relation between the two statements and noted a relationship between his
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diagrammatic representations. Interestingly, Hugo’s diagrammatic representation did not lead
directly to a truth-value. Hugo reread the task and unpacked its properties to affirm the statement
via property entailment. We see this reflected in Figure 19, where Hugo began productively
coordinating between the statements and his diagrams, but he reevaluated the task in a parallel
manner. Because Hugo’s pathway through the Euler diagram of statement three was unfruitful,
this again points to insufficient coordination between his representations. Perhaps more
importantly, this less than robust coordination (between representations) impeded the more
sophisticated coordination between syntactic transformations (converse) and diagrammatic
transformations (shifted reference). The remainder of exchange 5 presented a new type of task:
beginning with a truth-value (true), and then determining which statements would have that
truth-value. In Figure 19, this is seen by Hugo starting with one of his meanings for conditional
truth, producing a corresponding representation, and then associating that representation with a
statement. While Hugo did not exhibit coordination between meanings, representations, or
statements, with these tasks, I argue that Hugo still demonstrated some valuable logic learning at
the connection level. Namely, he exhibited reversibility in his thinking; he could start with a
truth-value, and through his meanings for conditional truth, produce true statements.
Framework Applied to Exchange 6
Hugo reinvented some promising relationships between various statements,
representations, and meanings, but up to exchange 6 he seemingly lacked consistency and
fluency when moving between tasks. Specifically, Hugo did not use one meaning consistently
across tasks. In large part, he seemed to approach each statement as unique, whereas from the
researcher standpoint the groups of statements Hugo was working with concerned the same
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mathematical objects. While Hugo’s determinations and justifications for each statement were
appropriate, the lack of consistency and the labored transitions between tasks seems problematic
from my researcher perspective. In this instance, Hugo affirmed two successive statements via
property entailment before shifting to spatial language use and constructing diagrams to explain
his determinations. Furthermore, the diagrams that Hugo initially created were unlike his
previous Euler diagrams and prompted the teacher-researcher to intervene. I claim that this
activity, in parallel paths, is evidence that he had not learned logic at the third level where he
could flexibly and consistently coordinate his representations and meanings across tasks. This is
particularly problematic with regards to justifying contrapositive equivalence. This is seen in
Figure 20 below, which accentuates Hugo’s insufficient coordination.
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Figure 20: Hugo’s mathematical logic learning in exchange 6 (* denotes significant interviewer
prompting).

When considering Hugo’s activity through this framework, it is again characterized by
parallel features. While Hugo readily coordinated the two statements (Statement 10: If a triangle
is not acute, then it is obtuse. Inverse of statement 10: If a triangle is acute, then it is not obtuse.)
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via syntactic transformations in the beginning, his subsequent determinations seemed to follow
parallel paths. Hugo first semantically affirmed both statements by considering property
entailment and produced illustrative examples. These chains of activity are nearly identical but
there is little to no evidence that Hugo was coordinating properties between the tasks. This is not
to downplay the success of his normative determinations (reading level activity), but rather
suggests a contributing factor to his difficulty in explaining contrapositive equivalence
(exchange 6, turn 24), which I consider connecting level activity. When Hugo was pushed to
further explain his thinking he shifted his language use and subsequent representation. In Figure
13, Hugo returned to a diagrammatic representation (although it was qualitatively different that
previous Euler diagrams), but it proved insufficient in leading to a determination. In this
instance, it seemed that Hugo’s diagram (in Figure 13) was recording his activity rather than
facilitating it. At this juncture in the exchange, the teacher-researcher heavily guided Hugo in
producing and relating the familiar Euler diagrams. However, Hugo’s concluding determination
for the inverse of statement ten remained ambiguous. It is difficult to discern what meaning
Hugo was using and whether it was coordinated with the meaning he used for statement ten. In
particular, I point to two areas in Hugo’s activity where absence of coordination likely
contributed to his tenuous account of contrapositive equivalence. First, Hugo did not coordinate
between property entailment and his Euler diagrams. Hugo’s activity implied that properties
corresponded to regions in his diagram (Figure 13) based on location relative to the statement.
How properties referred to regions and how the diagrams simultaneously represented property
relations and conditional truth remained problematic. This claim is supported by Hugo’s failure
to form a concluding determination. Second, Hugo did not coordinate between syntactic
transformations and diagrammatic transformations. This more sophisticated horizontal
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coordination, even with heavy guidance, is difficult to discern in this exchange. Hugo’s shift in
diagrammatic representation with these tasks suggests that Hugo was still attempting to establish
a reliable coordination that made sense to him. I believe that some of Hugo’s difficulties may
have stemmed from his fluctuating treatment of not in his interpretations. At times he readily
associated it with forming complement sets, and at other times he absorbed it into the logical
form “if…, then not…” with his empty intersection meaning. It is unclear whether Hugo had
logical control over these shifts, but it seems that it may have inhibited coordination between
syntactic transformations and diagrammatic transformations. Despite Hugo’s lack of awareness
of these implicit shifts in meaning for negation, I find evidence that Hugo engaged in much
successful logic learning at the connecting level. I believe that Hugo’s mathematical logic
learning progressed in this exchange (indicative of connecting), but that he still fell short of the
proposed fluency level learning.
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Framework Applied to Exchange 7
Lastly, in Figure 21, I present a schematic model of Elya’s activity to draw contrast to
Hugo.

Figure 21: Elya’s logic learning in exchange 7 (*denotes enhanced subset meaning).

Figure 21 illustrates Elya’s reinvention of contrapositive equivalence. Having
established syntactic relations between the statements prior to exchange 7, Elya independently
corroborated Hugo’s varied meanings. Unlike Hugo, Elya could also affirm the inverse of
statement nine by the subset meaning. Without additional guidance, Elya coordinated her
representation across statements. Furthermore, Elya seemed able to consciously reflect on, and
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coordinate, the activity that led to affirming the statements. Overall, Elya’s activity, as
represented in Figure 21, seems to be a more interconnected web when compared to Hugo’s
activity. Elya seemed to be consciously aware of her two treatments of ‘not’ and, as a result,
could transition between tasks and meanings. Based on Elya’s proficiency and apparent logical
control with this collection of statements, I believe she successfully coordinated syntactic
transformations with diagrammatic transformations. I posit that such sophisticated coordination
allowed her to see contrapositive equivalence as a logical necessity. While both students reached
normative determinations (successful reading level activity), the paths that they took were
qualitatively different. Hugo’s uncoordinated activity and diverse meanings did not afford
construction of logical necessity of contrapositive equivalence via the subset meaning. He
constructed alternate routes for affirming contrapositive statements even when explicitly exposed
to Elya’s generalizable justification.
This chapter presented a framework for mathematical logic learning. I further
distinguished three definitions of mathematical logic learning that are pedagogically and
analytically operational. With this framework, I revisited and modeled Hugo’s development in a
condensed, though informative, presentation. By overlaying this framework, I proposed models
of Hugo’s construction of mathematical logical understandings. In conclusion, this framework is
a research-based contribution to a LIT for the guided reinvention of truth-functional logic in
mathematics.
In the final chapter of this research study I will reflect on, and re-contextualize, my
findings with the related research literature. In particular, I revisit the central role of RME. I will
also recapitulate significant takeaways from this study that can inform future research.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this final chapter, I will reflect on the related research literature and draw connections
that I see between the findings I have presented and, specifically, Gravemeijer’s four-tiered
theoretical framework of emergent models. Lastly, I will end with a few final remarks about
what I view as successes in Hugo’s learning and “lessons learned” from this research study as a
whole.
Reflections on Research Literature
This study has sought to fill a gap in research pertaining to students’ reasoning about
mathematical logic. Psychological perspectives in the literature have studied logic as aspects of
student’s preconscious reasoning processes, whereas this study has focused on students’
conscious reflection and organization of their mathematical activities. Epp (2003) and
Stylianides, Stylianides, and Philippou (2004) have explored whether, and how, students adopt
mathematically normative ways of using mathematical language and validating inferences, but
they did not focus on the nature of the instruction that would support such normative behavior or
how it can be rooted in students’ mathematical activity. Hawthorne and Rasmussen (2015)
explored students’ reasoning about truth-tables, and other formalisms. These tools were not
taught through engaging students’ semantic reasoning about mathematics, and the authors found
that students’ understanding thereof seemed in some cases divorced from students’ reasoning
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about other mathematics. Durrand-Guerrier et al. (2012) problematized and compared different
mathematical meanings for conditional truth but did not address students’ coordination of
different meanings for conditional truth or the generalizability of students’ meanings across
tasks. Thus, the contributions of this report are novel to the mathematics education literature.
A key contribution of this study to the existing body of research is my presentation of a
research-based framework for mathematical logic learning. Grounded in the case study of Hugo,
I have distinguished three sequential levels of logic learning that can be analytically and
pedagogically operational. They are analytically useful as they afforded the preceding analysis of
Hugo’s activity and provided insight into his inability to justify contrapositive equivalence. This
framework is pedagogically operational inasmuch as it points to a trajectory by which connecting
and fluency logic learning can grow out of students’ mathematical activity. Future studies will be
required to elaborate particular instructional sequences viable at the level of whole-class
instruction. I present these findings and constructs as contributing elements to a Local
Instructional Theory (Larsen, 2013) for the guided reinvention of truth-functional logic. When
reflecting on the existing related literature, I can see facets of this study’s findings that call back
to the RME literature, namely, Gravemeijer’s (1999) levels of general activity and the emergent
model heuristic (e.g., Gravemeijer & Stephan, 2002). The sequential levels of logic learning that
I have presented bear semblance to Gravemeijer’s levels. The level of sophistication of student
activity certainly increases as students progress from reading to fluency. Furthermore, student
activity shifts from being semantically focused to being conscious of logical structure and forms
of justification. At the reading level, I have described student activity that is nearly synonymous
with the situational level as proposed by Gravemeijer as the task setting. At this level student
activity relied on semantics and illustrated students’ naïve interactions with the tasks.
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Gravemeijer’s referential and general levels share commonalities with what I have presented as
the connecting level. The connecting level encompasses student activity that identifies and builds
relationships between task-specific objects (referential level activity) and further includes
students’ relationship building that is less reliant on semantic details (general level activity). For
example, coordinating the ‘not’ operator with the complement relation constitutes activity within
a diagrammatic model rather than activity within the statement task. As student meanings for
conditional truth emerged, justifications for the previously determined truth-values increased in
sophistication. These justifications made more reference to meanings within the diagrammatic
model rather than within the semantic context. This reflects transitions toward Gravemeijer’s
general level activity. I do not mean to imply that students should abandon reasoning with the
semantic properties native to the task situation, but rather that the relationships in the model
should be abstracted to yield generalizable logical insights. Lastly, the fluency level, which I
ascribed to Elya, corresponds to Gravemeijer’s (1999) formal level of activity. To some degree,
Elya’s activity went far beyond the relationships evident among categories of triangles. Elya
called upon abstract relationships of logical structure and did so in a manner compatible with, but
not dependent on, semantic details.
This analysis thus reveals connections between my framework for logic learning and
emergent models. Specifically, students’ use of Euler diagrams provides a means by which the
set-based meanings for conditional truth can emerge. When Hugo initially began constructing
visual representations, they served as a model of his less formal solution strategy for determining
conditional truth (or falsehood). This model of was initially dependent on the semantic content of
the statements. I saw this when Hugo demonstrated parallel activity even when tasks related to
the same mathematical objects. Hugo’s subset relation and empty intersection meanings hinged
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upon generalizable mathematical relations within his Euler diagram model. These meanings
themselves became the objects of mathematical study. We saw this in exchange 5 when Hugo’s
task-representation-determination sequence was reversed and he first reflected on this model for
conditional truth.
Final Remarks
This study has set forth elements of a research-based footing for the learning of
mathematical logic. By tracking and analyzing Hugo’s reinvention of conditional truth, I have
presented student activity that is fruitful in constructing mathematical meanings. However,
simply developing these meanings anticipated by the researcher proved insufficient in Hugo’s
path toward achieving logical fluency within the given timeframe. Hugo was unable to
coordinate between syntactic transformations and diagrammatic transformations. The meanings
and relationships that Hugo constructed did not foster a sense of logical necessity for
contrapositive equivalence. I can attribute some of Hugo’s challenges to his construction of the
unanticipated empty intersection meaning and his lack of awareness and control over shifts in his
meanings for conditional truth. This constituted a positive accomplishment indicative of the type
of flexible thinking that would be greatly valued in subsequent proof-oriented activity.
Furthermore, Hugo engaged in many of NCTM’s process standards (2000), including
communication, connections, and representation.
This case study of Hugo facilitated the construction of a research-based framework of
mathematical logic learning that could inform future instructional design. Even through
thoughtfully implemented guided reinvention, Hugo developed understandings that demonstrate
the complexities of mathematical logic learning. Clearly, the findings of this case study should
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be supplemented by research at scale with whole class groups. Additional research is required
regarding the role of content and sentence structure to better discern which student preferences
can be harnessed and directed toward generalizable models of reference and truth for
mathematical statements. For example, I hypothesize that the natural structure of mathematical
categories (triangles, quadrilaterals, multiples, etc.) will influence students’ progressions of
activity in different ways, but how such differences should be used in instructional design
requires careful study. Given the centrality of mathematical logic in proof-based study, this area
of research warrants continued attention.
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From: Adi, Karplus, & Lawson (1980)

APPENDIX B
IF…THEN…TRUE/FALSE
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If…Then…True/False
Determine whether each of these statements is true or false and explain your reasoning. Try to
find any patterns for how and why these statements can be declared true or false.
1. If a number is a multiple of 3, then it is a multiple of 4.
2. If a number is a multiple of 3, then it is a multiple of 6.
3. If a number is a multiple of 6, then it is a multiple of 3.
4. If a number is not a multiple of 6, then it is not a multiple of 3.
5. If a number is not a multiple of 3, then it is not a multiple of 6.
6. If a triangle is not acute, then it is obtuse.
7. If a triangle is obtuse, then it is not acute.
8. If a triangle is not acute, then it is not equilateral.
9. If a quadrilateral is a rectangle, then it is a parallelogram.
10. If a quadrilateral is a rectangle, then it is a parallelogram.
11. If a quadrilateral is not a rhombus, the it is not a rectangle.
12. If two integers x and y are both odd, then x+y is even.
13. If the sum of two integers x+y is even, then x and y are both odd.
14. If at least one of the two integers x and y is not odd, then x+y is not even.
15. If the sum of two integers x+y is not even, then at least one of the numbers x and y is not
odd.
16. If the integers x and y have opposite parity, then x+y is odd.
17. If the integers x and y do not have opposite parity, then x+y is not odd.
Examine the relationship between the set of objects satisfying the first part of each statement and
the set of objects satisfying the second part.

